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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Automobiles-Guest's Duty-Contributory Negligence
as a Matter of Law
The Virginia Supreme Court in Butler v. Dardeit' recently held
that under certain circumstances as a matter of law the guest rider in
a car has a duty to warn the driver of approaching dangers. The facts
show that plaintiff guest was sitting in the front seat of defendant's
car. The car was approaching a railroad crossing, with which the guest
1189 Va. 459, 53 S. E. 2d 146 (1949).
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was familiar, at ten miles per hour, and the guest did not, until within
ten feet of the tracks, give any warning of the train which crashed into
the automobile in which he was a passenger. The Court held that failure of plaintiff to give warning was contributory negligence as a matter
of law and set aside a verdict for plaintiff. Mr. Justice Cardozo in
criticizing a like result under similar circumstances pointed out that
negligence of the guest is to be determined by the facts and circumstances of the particular case 2 Consideration of whether the passenger
believed the driver would take the necessary precautions, whether a
warning was needless, or whether the warning of the guest might be
dangerous were all possibilities to be weighed by triers of the facts.
The North Carolina view is that it is the duty of the guest to keep a
reasonable lookout for trains as the automobile approaches the tracks,
and to warn the driver of any impending danger of a collision if it is
apparent to the guest that the driver has not seen the engine, or having
seen it, does not appreciate the danger of a collision.8
In the principal case the Court considers the position of the guest
in the car, his familiarity with the road, and other factors as imposing
on the guest a high degree of care for his own safety. Poor visibility
has been considered by other courts as requiring from the guest a
sharper lookout. 4

Certainly, if circumstances determine the degree of

altertness required, poor visibility should demand that the guest keep
a more alert watch for dangers.
Generally a distinction is made between the duty imposed on the
guest rider approaching a busy street intersection as compared with his
duty at a railroad crossing. The failure to give warning, if the guest
had a chance to look, at a railroad intersection is contributory negligence
as a matter of law, but at a highway crossing, contributory negligence
of the guest is generally a jury question. 5 The basis for the distinction
is premised on the inability of trains to stop as quickly as automobiles
or to turn aside to avoid any obstacle upon the track.6 Considering the
'Baker v. Lehigh Ry., 248 N. Y. 131, 161 N. E. 445 (1928).
'Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 205 N. C. 127, 170 S. E. 120 (1933);
Smith v. Atlantic & Y. Ry., 200 N. C. 177, 156 S. E. 508 (1931) ; See Notes, 11
N. C.L. Rzv.349 (1932), 9 N. C. L. REv. 98 (1930).
'Ames v. Terminal Ry. Ass'n, 332 Ill. App. 187, 75 N. E. 2d 42 (1947);
Gilly v. Harris, 152 So. 378 (La. App. 1934) ; Peasley v. White, 129 Me. 450, 152
Atl. 530 (1930); Adams v. Hutchinson, 113 W. Va. 217, 167 S. E. 135 (1932);
But cf. Uren v. Purity Dairy Co., 252 Wis. 446, 32 N. W. 2d 615 (1948).
'Hill v. Lopez, 228 N. C. 433, 45 S. E. 2d 296 (1947) ; Campion v. Eakle, 79
Colo. 320, 246 Pac. 280 (1926) ; Hunsavage v. Rocek, 74 Colo. 163, 219 Pac. 1080
(1923) ; Earhart v. Treatbar, 148 Kan. 42, 80 P. 2d 4 (1938) ; Moore v. Retz, 314
Mich. 52, 22 N. W. 2d 68 (1946) ; Landy v. Rosenstein, 325 Pa. 209, 188 Atl. 855
(1937) ; Hancock v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 149 Va. 829, 141 S. E. 849 (1928) ; Gilkerson v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 129 W. Va. 649, 41 S. E. 2d 188 (1946) ; Jones v.
Virginia Ry., 115 W. Va. 665, 177 S. E. 621 (1934).
'Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Golay, 155 F. 2d 842 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Leclair v.

Boudreau, 101 Vt. 270, 143 Atl. 401 (1928).
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higher speeds obtained by cars and the greater number of highway intersections, should a lesser duty be required at a highway intersection than
at a railroad crossing? The more logical solution would be to let the
jury determine that degree of care required in both situations.
Passengers of automobiles take note: the back seat is at a premium.
The occupant of the back seat has less duty of lookout than if he were
in the front seat." Mr. Justice Cardozo criticized as contrary to the
common standard of conduct the rule requiring the same duty of lookout
by a guest, whether in the front or back seat, when approaching a railroad. 8 The basis, however, upon which the guest is barred from recovery is that he did not exercise a reasonable degree of care for his
own safety. 9 Following this rule, the guest cannot rely blindly upon
the alertness of the driver, but must, under the circumstances, exercise
a reasonable degree of care for his own safety.
If the guest because of age, inability to operate an automobile, or
for other reasons, is unfamiliar with dangers of automobile travel, he
has no duty to give warning of dangers. 1° This type of guest would
not recognize dangers apparent to others, and, under the circumstances,
would be exercising the required degree of caution for his own safety.
Does the paying passenger have the same degree of duty as the
gratuitous guest?-: A bus passenger 12 and taxi occupant' 8 have been
held to have no duty to keep a lookout. The "share-the-ride" passenger,
paying for his transportation, can rely more on the driver than the
gratuitous guest. 14 It would seem that in consideration of the fare,
the passenger is relieved from maintaining a lookout. The guest's own
negligence may, however, preclude a recovery although he has paid for
the ride.' 5
The guest statutes are not phrased to cover the duty of the guest
to the host or himself, but only the duty of the driver to his gratuitous
guest.'0 The guest's duty is in need of clarification. One of the dangers recognized by the courts is that by requiring too active a part from
the guest in the operation of the automobile, back-seat driving will be
'Davis v. Joseph, 164 So. 467 (La. App. 1935) ; Banks v. Adams, 135 Me. 270,
v. Carey, 279 Mich. 269, 271 N. W. 754 (1937).
' Cardozo, A Ministry of Ju(stice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 121 (1921).

195 Ati. 206 (1937) ; Fabiano

' Smith v. Atlantic & Y. Ry., 200 N. C. 177, 156 S. E. 508 (1931).
'0 Kelly v. Hanwick, 288 Ala. 336, 153 So. 269 (1934) ; Banks v. Adams, 135
Me. 270, 195 Atl. 206 (1937) ; Noakes v. New York C. & H. Ry., 121 App. Div.
716, 106 N. Y. Supp. 322 (1907), aff'd, 195 N. Y. 543, 88 N. E. 1126 (1909).
" Silver v. Silver, 280 U. S. 117 (1929).
12 Miller v. Blue Ridge Transp. Co., 123 W. Va. 428, 15 S. E. 2d 400 (1941).
"3Yellow Cab Co. v. Eden, 178 Va. 325, 16 S. E. 2d 625 (1941); Scales v.
Boynton Cab Co., 198 Wis. 293, 223 N. W. 836 (1929).
1 Dennis v. Wood, 357 Mo. 886, 211 S. W. 2d 470 (1948).
15

HUDDY, THE LAW OF AUTOmOBILEs 196 (1927) ; 1 LAW OF AUTOMOBILES IN
NORTH CAROLINA §55 (3rd Michie ed. 1947).
1
MALCOLmu, AUTOmOBrLE GUEST LAW 1 (1937). North Carolina does not have

guest statute. See Note 9 N. C. L. REv. 47 (1930) (proposed guest statute).
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encouraged. 17 It is negligence to interfere with the driver in some situations, but in others, non-interference will bar the guest from recovery.
Any rigid rule to apply to all situations is undesirable. The probable
North Carolina rule is that when danger arising out of the operation of

a vehicle by another is manifest to a passenger or guest who has adequate opportunity to control the situation by warning the driver, and

he sits without protest and permits himself to be driven to his injury,
his negligence will bar a recovery-such negligence is not the negligence
of the driver imputed to him as a passenger, but his own negligence in
joining with the driver and facing manifest danger.' 8 The courts should,

however, consider each situation upon its facts, and apply the usual
negligence rule of the conduct of the reasonable man under the circumstances. The adoption of a statute to cover this situation in inadvisable

because a statute cannot be phrased to cover all the variations that are
sure to arise. The rule that a guest must exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances should be applied in all cases, regardless of the guest's
position in the automobile or his familiarity with automobile travel.

Further, unless negligence or the lack of it is clear, the issue of negligence should be submitted to the jury. Constant application of this rule
might lead to clarification of an automobile guest's duty to keep a lookout.
HUNTFR D. HEGGIE.
Chattel Motgages-Recordation-Persons Protected
At common law a chattel mortgage was valid as between the parties
thereto without change of possession ;1 but, in order to be upheld against
the attack of interested third persons, a transfer of possession to the
mortgagee was essential. 2 The early registration acts,3 designed pri17 Hedges v.Mitchell, 69 Colo. 285, 194 Pac. 620 (1920) ;Bradley v.Interurban
Ry., 191 Iowa 1351, 183 N. W. 493 (1921); Chambers v. Hawkins, 223 Ky. 211,
25 S. W. 2d 363 (1930) ; Young v. White Sulphur Ry., 96 W. Va. 534, 123 S. E.
433 (1924).
1 1 LAW OF AUTOMOBILES IN NORTH CAROLINA §35 (3rd Michie ed. 1947).
'Williams v. Jones, 95 N. C. 504 (1886); McCoy v. Lassiter, 95 N. C. 88
(1886); Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283 (1853); Pike v. Armstead, 16 N. C.
110 (1827).
McCoy v.Lassiter, 95 N. C.88 (1886); see Cowan v.Dale, 189 N. C. 684,
128 S.E. 155 (1925); 1 JoNEs, CHATTEL MORTAGES AND CONDIOTIONL SALES §176
(Rev. ed. 1933) ; cases cited 10 Am. Jur, CHATTEL MORTGAGES, §157.
'N. C. Act of 1715, c. 38 §11: ". . . , That every mortgage of . . . goods or
chattels, which shall be first registered in the register's office . . . where the
mortgager (sic) liveth, shall be taken, deemed, judged, allowed of and held to be
the first mortgage, and be good, firm, substantial and lawful; in all courts of Justice within this government; any former or other mortgage of the same .. . .
goods or chattels, not before registered, notwithstanding; unless such prior mortgage be registered within fifty days after the date." N. C. Act of 1820, c. 3 §1:
"That no mortgage, nor deed or conveyance in trust for any estate, whether real
or personal . . . , shall be good and available in law against creditors or pur-

chasers for a valuable consideration, unless the same shall have been proven and
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marily to eliminate the necessity of transfer, were often inadequate and
led to unfortunate results. In North Carolina under the act of 1715,
courts of equity upheld unregistered chattel mortgages against the claims
of creditors or purchasers of the mortgagor who had notice of the
existence of the mortgage, 4 and this rule was extended to give protection against an incumbrance registered after the execution of such
mortgage when there had been actual notice, even though the prior mortgage had not been registered within the statutory time.5 In order to
avoid this result, the act of 1820 was passed, extending the time within
which a mortgage could be registered and yet retain its priority, and
declaring a mortgage not registered within such time null and void as
against purchasers and creditors of the mortgagor. The privilege thus
conferred upon the mortgagee was much abused in that he could intentionally withhold his mortgage from record as long as possible in order
to allow the mortgagor greater freedom in dealing with his creditors.(
The Act of 1829, 7 which, in effect, is substantially the same today, was
enacted to meet this situation. This statute has not affected the common law rule as to the validity of the mortgage between the parties,8
registered ....

within six months after the execution of such mortgage or deed,

or conveyance in trust; but that all mortgages, deeds, and conveyances in trust,
not so proven and registered within the time aforesaid, shall be held as against
such creditors or purchasers, as utterly null and void."
' Pike v. Armstead, 16 N. C. 110 (1827) ; see Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684,
128 S. E. 155 (1925); Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C. 358 (1874); Fleming v.
Burgin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843).
'Pike v. Armstead, 16 N. C. 110 (1827). This rule was equitable in its operation, if, as appears to have been the case, it applied only when there was actual
notice of the existence of the unrecorded mortgage prior to the credit extension.
In such case, there could have been no possibility of prejudice through action in
reliance on the unincumbered state of the title. There were, however, other considerations which the equity doctrine failed to take into account, namely, the legislative policy of encouraging prompt registration, and the desirability of having the
public record full and conclusive.
'See, for example, Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283 (1853) ; Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843).
N. C. Act of 1829, c. 20 §1. In its present form this is N. C. GEN. STAT.
§47-20 (1943): "No deed of trust or mortgage for real or personal estate shall
be valid at law to pass any property as against creditors or purchasers for a valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or mortgagor, but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage in the county where the land lies; or in
the case of personal estate, where the donor, bargainor or mortgagor resides; or
in case the donor, bargainor or mortgagor resides out of the state, then in the
county where the said personal estate, or some part of the same, is situated; . . ."
8 See discussion in Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283 (1853) ; 1 JONES, op. cit.
mspra, note 2, §237; cases cited 14 C. J. S., CHATrL MORTGAGES §134. Since an

unrecorded mortgage is binding on mortgagor, it follows that it is binding on all
claiming in mortgagor's right: Hinkle Crauge Co. v. Greene, 125 N. C. 489, 34
S. E. 554 (1899) ; Williams v. Jones, 95 N. C. 504 (1886) (wife's claim for year's
allowance or dower); McBrayer v. Harrill, 152 N. C. 712, 68 S. E. 204 (1910);
ANNO., 91 A. L. R. 299 (1934) (heir or personal representative).
Although valid, an unrecorded mortgage does not create an equity in favor of
the mortgagee in the property which would be superior to the rights of creditors,
purchasers or subsequent mortgagees with notice thereof. Such an equity arises
only when the transaction need not be in writing and thus is without the purview
of the registration statute. Roberts v. Massey, 185 N. C. 164, 116 S. E. 407 (1923)
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but its uniform construction has been that mere notice of the unregistered mortgage does not make it valid as against a purchaser for a valuable consideration.9 Furthermore, if the person taking the property
is placed by law in the position of a purchaser, 10 he has been held to be
within the protected class who may take advantage of the failure to
record.
When the third person claiming against the rights of an unregistered
mortgage is of the description "creditor," more difficulty arises. In
the case of Finance Corp. v. Hodges," recently decided by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, a creditor procured a judgment against the
mortgagor nine months before a chattel mortgage was given to secure
part of the purchase price of an automobile. During the period of less
than a month when the mortgage was unrecorded, the judgment creditor caused execution to issue and the sheriff levied upon the chattel.
Four days later an assignee of the mortgagee caused the mortgage to
be recorded and instituted suit to recover possession. Held: The judgment creditor by his levy had obtained the prior lien. The decision
appears to be in accord with the settled rule in this state since the creditor had armed himself with legal process which entitled him to an interest in the property before the mortgage was registered. 12 A dictum
in the case indicated that only a creditor who has fastened a lien upon
the mortgaged property can claim protection against an unrecorded
mortgage. Since the statute does not declare an unrecorded mortgage
void, but only that it is invalid to pass any property interest but from
registration, this conclusion is logical. There appears to be, however,
no direct holding to the effect that it is absolutely necessary that a lien
(correction of omission in deed due to mutual mistake) ; Spence v. Pottery Co.,
185 N. C. 218, 117 S. E. 32 (1923) (parol trust) ; cf. Finance Corp. v. Hodges,
230 N. C. 580 582, 55 S. E. 2d 201, 203 (1949).
'E.g. Weil v. Herring, 207 N. C. 6, 195 S. E. 836 (1934); Carolina Discount
Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414 (1925) ; Cowan v. Dale,
189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925) ; Bank of Colerain v. Cox, 171 N. C. 76, 87
S. E. 967 (1916) ; Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C. 358 (1875). But cf. Fleming
v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843) ; Note 24 N. C. L. Rxv. 63, 65-66 (1945). Same
rule applies when suit in equity. See Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283, 286 (1853).
A purchaser for value within purview of statute may be one who takes in payment of preexisting debt. Starr v. Wharton, 177 N. C. 323, 98 S. E. 818 (1919) ;
Brem v. Lockhart, 93 N. C. 191 (1885) ; Potts v. Blackwell, 57 N. C. 58 (1858).
But cf. Finance Corp. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201 (1949), Headnote
4 of which states the contrary rule, but this related to dictum dealing with creation of an equity resting in parol. See examples note 8 supra.
1o For example, assignee for benefit of creditors, Starr v. Wharton, 177 N. C.
323, 98 S. E. 818 (1919), and cases cited therein; cf. Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C.
684, 128 S.E. 155 (1925). But see, JoNEs, op. cit. supra note 2, §244.
11230 N. C. 580, 55 S.E. 2d 201 (1949).
- 2 E.g. Salassa v. Mortgage Co., 196 N. C. 501, 146 S. E. 83 (1928) (attachment lien prior to recordation) ; Jordan v. Wetmur, 202 N. C. 279, 162 S. E. 610
(1932) (subsequent mortgage recorded prior to conditional sale agreement);
Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526 (1918) (receiver appointed
prior to recordation) ; accord Bostic v. Young, 116 N. C. 766, 21 S. E. 552 (1895).
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be acquired prior to registration. Dicta in other cases may be urged
in support of conflicting rules,13 but in view of the doctrine generally
accepted by other jurisdictions 14 and the federal construction' 3 given
the statute, there is little doubt that the court would hold that a general
creditor does not come within the class protected. In applying this rule
there would be no distinction between a prior or existing creditor, and
a creditor subsequently extending credit. 16
The purpose to be served by a registration statute and the rights
and interests to be protected are properly considered in determining
whether a particular type of creditor ought to be protected. As has
been pointed out, the primary aim in the enactment of the present statute

was to provide a satisfactory method whereby the mortgagor, without
possible injury to innocent third parties, might retain possession of the
property. 17 Another purpose was to encourage prompt registration by
making such registration conclusive notice, and to protect the rights of
a mortgagee who acted with diligence and good faith.' s This statute,
as it has been construed by the North Carolina Supreme Court, fails to
accomplish these purposes in two major aspects: (1) A general creditor,
who has extended credit to a mortgagor on the faith of lack of prior
existing rights against the mortgagor, may, without fault on his part,
find that he must suffer loss upon subsequent registration of a mortgage
executed prior to the credit extension; (2) A mortgagee, who with dilisee Ellington v. Raleigh
13 That all creditors without limitation are included
Building Supply Co., 196 N. C. 784, 789, 147 S. E. 30, 310 (1929); Sneeden v.
Nurnberger's Market, 192 N. C. 439, 441, 135 S. E. 328, 330 (1926); Harris v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 190 N. C. 480, 485, 130 S. E. 319, 322 (1925).
That only creditors acquiring liens while mortgage withheld from record are
included, see Observer Corp. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 43, 94 S. E. 526, 527 (1918) ;
Francis v. Herren, 101 N. C. 497, 507, 8 S. E. 353, 358 (1888) ; accord, Williamson v. Bitting, 159 N. C. 321, 74 S. E. 808 (1912).
'4 See note 33 hifra.
15 Creditors as used in the North Carolina statute means lien creditors only.
Southern Dairies v. Banks, 92 F. 2d 282 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 761
(1937) , Elk Creek Lumber Co. v. Hamby, 84 F. 2d 144 (4th Cir. 1936) ; In- re
Cunningham, 64 F. 2d 296 (4th Cir. 1933) ; National Bank of Goldsboro v. Hill,
226 Fed. 102 (D. C. N. C. 1915) ; see Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Coggin, 78 F. 2d 471, 475 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 621 (1935).
1' Under the present North Carolina construction the sole question appears to
be whether a creditor has acquired a lien prior to recordation, and no distinction
is made between a creditor who extended credit prior to the execution of the
mortgage and one who extended credit during the interval when the mortgage -was
unrecorded. That a prior creditor acquiring a lien while the mortgage was unrecorded is included, see Finance Corp. v. Hodges, 230 N. C. 580, 55 S. E. 2d 201
(1949) ; Fleming v. Graham, 110 N. C. 374, 14 S. E. 922 (1892) ; cf. Credit Co. v.
Walters, 230 N. C. 443, 53 S. E. 2d 520 (1949). Likewise, subsequent creditors
thus acquiring a lien are included. Salassa v. Mortgage Co., 196 N. C. 501, 146
S. E. 83 (1928) ; Jordan v. Wetmur, 202 N. C. 279, 162 S. E. 610 (1932).
1

Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C. 684, 128 S. E. 155 (1925) ; McCoy v. Lassiter,

95 N. C. 88 (1886); see Credit Corp. v. Walters, 230 N. C. 443, 447, 53 S. E.

523 (1949).
2d 520,
8

" Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry, 195 N. C. 508, 142 S. E. 767 (1928) ; Smith
v. Fuller, 152 N. C. 7, 67 S. E. 48 (1910) ; Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843).
Compare Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 376, 377 (1949).
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gence seeks to record and preserve his lien, may find that a creditor with
knowledge of the reasonable delay in recordation has acquired a prior
l1ien.
An examination of the recording statutes of other jurisdictions reveals much diversity of phraseology. The types of statutes may be
generally classified as follows: (1) Those declaring the mortgage to be
a valid and prior lien from the date of recordation, 19 thus dealing only
with when the lien of a mortgage shall become effective. No mention
is made of the invalidity of the mortgage as to any specified group of
persons. (2) Those providing that no mortgage shall be valid against
the rights and interests of any third person, or persons other than the
mortgagor or his heirs, unless it is recorded.2 0 These statutes do not
specify the effect a later recordation will have on the rights of those
persons as to whom it was once void. (3) Those declaring an unrecorded mortgage void, inoperative, or of no effect against specified types
21
of claimants, including creditors of the mortgagor, until recordation.
The principal difference from the second group is the designation of
the class protected. Those jurisdictions whose statutes come within
the first class have primarily faced the problem of determining whether
there has been a sufficient compliance with the statute,2 2 and the question of which creditors are protected has apparently not been raised.
Since these statutes do not provide that a mortgage is void as to named
third persons, but rather that a lien vests in the mortgagee upon recordation, the creditor who has not acquired a prior right in the property
would seem to be eliminated. On the other hand, the statutes of the
"IARK. STAT. ANN. §16-201 (1947); DEL. REV. CODE §§3333, 3336 (1935);
GA. CODE ANN.

§§67-108, 109, 2501 (1935) ; LA.

GEN. STAT.

§5022.4 (1949 Supp.);

art. 21 §§45, 52, 54, 56 (1939); MONT. Rv. CODE ANN. §§8278,
8279 (1935) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§940.5, 13 (1948 Supp.).
20 COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 32 §§1, 8 (1935) ; CONN. STAT. tit. 58 §7268 (1949);
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 95 §§1, 4 (1934); ME. REv. STAT. c. 164 §1 (1944); ANN.
LAWS MASS. c. 255 §1 (1932); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §3486 (1942); N. H. Rzv.
LAWS c. 262 §§17 et seq. (1942) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 442 §10 (1938) ; UTAH CODE
ANN. §13-0-1 (1949 Supp.) ; VT. STAT. §§2713 et seq. (1947) ; Wis. STAT. §§241:08,
241:10 (1947), as amended, Wis. Laws 1949, c. 429.
21 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47 §§110, 123 (1940) ; ARIZ. CODE ANN. §62-523 (1939);
MD. ANN. CODE,

CALIF. CIVIL CODE §2957 (1945 Amdt.) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. §698.01
CODE §45-1103 (1948); BURNS IND. STAT. ANN. §51-504 (1947

(1944);
Supp.);

IDAHO
IOWA

CODE ANN. tit. 24 §556.3 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §58-301 (1935); KY
REv. STAT. §382.270 (1948) ; MIca. STAT. ANN. §§26.926, 927, 929 (1949 Supp.);
MINN. STAT. §511.01 (Henderson 1945); Miss. CODE ANN. §§868, 869 (1942);
NED. REv. STAT. §36-301 (1943); NEV. ComP. LAWS §§987, 988 (Supp. 1931-

1941); N. J.STAT. ANN. §§46:28-5, 10 (1940); N. M k. STAT. ANN. §63-502
(1941); N. Y. LIEN LAW §230 (1940); N. D. REv. CODE §35-0406 (1943) ; OHIO
GEw. CODE ANN. §§8560 et seq. (1938); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46 §§57, 58 (1936) ;
ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§68-203, 207 (1943 Supp.); S. C. CODE ANN. §8875
(1942); S. D. CODE §§39.0408; 39.0411 (1939) ; TENN. CODa ANN. §7192 (Williams, 1934); TEXAS CrvIL STAT. ANN. art. 5490 (1949 Supp.); VA. CODE ANN.
§§5194; 5200 (1942); WASHr. REv. STAT. ANN. §3780 (1943 Supp.) ; W. VA. CODE

ANN. §3993 (1943); WYt. Comp. STAT. ANN. §§59-105, 113 (1945).
22 Gasconade Development Co. v. Trust Co., 195 Ark. 404, 112 S.W. 2d 653

(1938).
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second class are as broad as possible in their terms, thus admitting of

almost any interpretation to effectuate their purposes. Generally, these
jurisdictions have given protection to the general creditor. 28 There
are, however, other states, 24 which have narrowly defined the class
protected, excluding general creditors whether prior or subsequent.
Those states having statutes of the third type make up by far the largest
group. Of these, Idaho and New Mexico have given an express legislative mandate that only lien creditors are intended. 25 The legislatures

of Kentucky and Washington have specified otherwise, expressly providing that the term "creditors" shall include all creditors irrespective of
whether they have acquired a lien. 20 The South Carolina statute is
limited in its operation to those creditors extending credit while the
mortgage is withheld from record. 27 Aside from these exceptions, no
qualification or limitation is attached to designate those classes of creditors intended, thus leaving the courts to their own determination.
In the construction of recordation statutes the courts have followed
various lines of reasoning. Several jurisdictions - have treated the
situation as involving two separate consideration: the first, the legal
right of protection; the second, the procedure necessary before a creditor with such legal right is in a position to derive benefit therefrom.
Following this approach, there is prima facie agreement that a general
creditor, whether prior or subsequent, is given the legal right of protection. 29 This apparent uniformity ceases when it is sought to determine what the protected creditor must do to keep his protection. At
this point some jurisdictions make a distinction between prior and sub23 Basing their decisions on the policy of the statute and a comparison of the
broad phraseology of their statutes with those of other jurisdictions, Utah and
Missouri have reached the result that a mortgage is void as to those extending
credit while unrecorded and no lien is required before recordation. Volker Lumber
Co. v. Utah and Oregon Lumber Co., 45 Utah 603, 148 Pac. 365 (1915) ; Harrison
v. South Carthage Min. Co., 95 Mo. App. 80, 68, S. W. 963 (1902). Connecticut,
Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, whose statutes provide that
mortgages must be recorded within a designated time have concluded that a mortgage not so recorded remains void as to interim creditors even though subsequently
recorded. Collateral Finance Co. v. Brand, 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N. E. 2d 392
(1938) ; compare Drew v. Streeter, 137 Mass. 460 (1884) with Connecticut Valley Onion Co., 281 Mass. 287, 183 N. E. 526 (1932) ; Bordick v. Coates, 22 R. I.
410. 48 Atl. 389 (1901).
" Bogdon v. Fort, 75 Colo. 231, 225 Pac. 247 (1924) ; Graham v. Perry, 200
Wis. 211, 228 N. W. 135 (1929).
" IDAHo CODE §45-1103 (1948) ; N. Max. STAT. ANN. §63-502 (1941).
"0 Ky. Ray. STAT. §382.270 (1948); WASH. REv. SrAT. ANN. §3780 (Supp.
1943).
" S. C. CoDE ANN. §8875 (1942).
"8 E.g. Cameron v. Marvin, 26 Kans. 612 (1881) ; Harrison v. South Carthage
Min. Co., 95 Mo. App. 80, 68 S. W. 963 (1902) ; Il re Shay's Estate, 157 Misc.
615, 285 N. Y. Supp. 379 (1935) ; Union National Bank v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54
N. W. 1034 (1892) ; Raney v. Riedy, 70 S. D. 174, 16 N. W. 2d 194 (1944) ;
Wasatch Live Stock Loan Co. v. Nielson, 90 Utah 307, 56 P. 2d 613 (1936) ; 10
Am. JuR., CHATm MORTGAGES, §103.
"9Cases cited note 28 supra.
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sequent creditors, requiring the prior creditor to arm himself with a
lien prior to recordation, while allowing a subsequent creditor to retain
protection without a lien. 30 In such a case, even though the subsequent
creditor can claim no interest in the chattel until he has acquired a lien,
this may be done at any time, and a later transfer of possession or
recordation of the mortgage is ineffective even though made before the
creditor obtains his lien. Other jurisdictions treat prior and subsequent
creditors alike. Several of these, while professing to give general
creditors protection, require the procurement of a lien before recordation in both instances. 31 Others hold the statute absolute in its terms,
and a mortgage not recorded as required is void as to all creditors.
32
Subsequent action by the mortgagee cannot give it validity.
33
The great majority of courts have made no attempt to divide their
holdings into legal rights and procedure, but have flatly announced that
"creditors" as used in their statutes does not include "mere general
creditors." Thus, unless a creditor has perfected a lien prior to recordation, his rights and interests are subordinated to those of the mortgagee.
The reason generally assigned for this holding is that any debtor has a
right to prefer one creditor over another, and general creditors should
not be allowed to complain when priority is given a mortgage upon its
recordation, since they are then in the same position as if the mortgage
had been executed at the time of recordation. 34 Such reasoning is logically sound in so far as it applies to creditors who extended credit prior
to the original execution of the mortgage. 35 When applied to a creditor
oRansom & Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 261 N. W. 128 (1935);
Harrison v. South Carthage Min. Co., 95 Mo. App. 80, 68 S. W. 963 (1902);
Wilkinson, Gaddis & Co. v. Bolen, 88 N. J.L. 680, 97 Atl. 279 (1916); Union
National Bank v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54 N. W. 1034 (1892); Hollenbeck v.
Louden, 36 S.D. 320, 152 N. IV. 116 (1935).
21 Such jurisdictions claim allowance of protection since general creditors are
free to acquire a lien, a right they would not otherwise have. When the lien must
be acquired prior to recordation, the apparent leniency disappears, and the result
is the same as if the court had declared only lien creditors protected. See Cameron
v. Marvin, 26 Kans. 612 (1881). But cf. Campbell v. Killion, 124 Kans. 124, 257
Pac. 752 (1927).
" Chelhar v. Acme Garage, 18 Calif. App. 2d 755, 61 P. 2d 1232 (1936) (lien
acquired after possession taken by mortgagee) ; Karst v. Gane, 136 N. Y. 316, 32
N. E. 1073 (1893) ; Skilton v. Codington, 185 N. Y. 80, 77 N. E. 790 (1906) (lien
acquired after unreasonable delay in recording). See generally: Union National
Bank v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54 N. W. 1034 (1892).
" Compare Moore v. Chilson, 26 Ariz. 244, 224 Pac. 818 (1924) with C. I. T.
Corp. v. Seaney, 53 Ariz. 72, 85, P. 2d 713 (1938) ; Bogdon v. Fort, 75 Colo. 231,
225 Pac. 247 (1924) ; McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939) ; litre
Lewis' Estate, 230 Iowa 694, 298 N. W. 842 (1941) ; Munck v. Security Bank, 175
Minn. 47, 220 N. W. 400 (1928) ; Boody v. Star Furniture Co., 45 S.W. 2d 291
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; 1 JoNs, op. cit. supra note 2, §247b; 14 C. J.S., CHrrAEL
MORTGAGES, §137.
2 Cases cited 14 C. J.S., CHATTEL MORTGAGES, §137.
"nBut prior creditors are entitled to some protection notwithstanding this reasoning. "The injury that an unfiled chattel mortgage may occasion an antecedent
creditor is likely to arise from the apparent unincumbered ownership of the property in the possession of the debtor, justifying the inference of perfect security,
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subsequently extending credit, the consideration is overlooked that he
may have acted on the assumption that there were no outstanding rights
against the property, and although the debtor may prefer in the future,
the creditor contemplates that risk.3 6
In recent years a growing minority of states have realized that those
constructions adopted by their courts are failing to carry out the policy
behind recordation. These states have modified their statutes in order
to compel a result giving adequate protection to subsequent creditors
even though they have acquired no property interest prior to recordation. 37 If the recordation statute of North Carolina were modified in
this aspect, its operation would be logically sound and in accord with
the purposes of such statutes.
The second failure of the North Carolina rule, although not as great
as the first, should be given consideration. If protection is to be extended to third persons when they adhere to the policy of the law, in all
fairness equal protection should be extended to innocent and diligent
mortgagees. In attempting to meet this situation a few jurisdictions
have given the mortgagee a limited time within which to record his
mortgage and preserve his lien against others intervening between the
making of the mortgage and its recordation. 3 8 Although the early rule
in this state to this effect proved unjust in its operation, 39 this was due
largely to the long period of time allowed within which to record. A
short, designated period of grace, consistent with the use of due dili40
gence, would accomplish the desired results.
EMERY

B. DENNY, JR.

and inducing delay in the enforcement of his claim. Were none but subsequent
creditors within the purview of the statute, the [prior] judgment creditor may also
be injured by the levying of an execution on property described in a secret mortgage, instead of the unincumbered property of the judgment debtor; .. ." Pierson
v. Hickey, 16 S. D. 46, 91 N. W. 339 (1902). But cf. Credit Corp. v. Walters,
230 N. C. 443, 447, 53 S.E. 2d 520, 523 (1949).
" Union National Bank v. Oium, 3 N. D. 193, 54 N. W. 1034 (1892).
" Conn. Pub. Acts 1945, c. 274 §905h; Mass. Stat. 1874, c. 111 §1; Me. Laws
1919, c. 121 §1; R. I. Acts 1899, c. 614 §1 (a mortgage must be recorded within
a specified number of days, and recording thereafter void. If a creditor acquires a
lien before the mortgage recorded, it is prior even though mortgage subsequently
recorded within the time specified) ; Ill. Laws 1931 p. 669 §1 (mortgage not valid
as against creditors unless filed or recorded within 10 days. Construed to include
general creditors when compared with other provisions. Collateral Finance Co.
v. Braud, 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N. E. 2d 392 (1938), 27 ILL. BAR. Joum 345
(1939)); Ky. Acts 1916, c. 41; Wash. Laws 1915, p. 277 §1 (express provision
inserted that creditors shall include all creditors irrespective of whether they have
acquired a lien).

"DEL. RZEv. CoDE §§3333, 3336 (1935)

(10 days) ; Mz. RF,. STAT. c. 164 §1

(1944) (20 days); WAsHr. Rzv. STAT. ANN. §3780 (Supp. 1943)

(10 days).

"' See note 3 supra. Also discussion in Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283, 286
(1853).
,0Compare Note 26 N. C. L. R1v. 173, 178 (1948).
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Corporations-Dissolution at Instance of Minority Stockholders
At one time minority stockholders were unable under any circumstances to sue for and obtain a dissolution of winding up1 of a corporation and a distribution of its assets. It was uniformly2 held that courts
of equity, by virtue of their lack of inherent power, i.e, lack of power
absent statutory delegation, 3 were incapable of affording such drastic
relief-' in a suit from that quarter.5
Prior to the widespread enactment of general incorporation laws, one
of the reasons for the rule was that the corporate charter was a special
dispensation of the State-from which it was inferred that only the
State could revoke it. But the deep entrenchment of the rule and the
uniformity of its application were ultimately due in large measure to
the then extreme rarity of corporate abuses that would justify dissolution, in contrast to the abundance of circumstances for which a lesser
remedy, or no remedy at all, would be suitable. This extreme disproportion served as a basis upon which the courts confounded the alleged
lack of power with the undesirability of exercising it in a great majority
of cases.0 Thus the courts arrived, by way of an overweening generalization, at a rule which was categorical both in statement and application; but which in statement was essentially unsound, and in application
occasionally unjust.
That courts of equity do have the power in the absence of statute to
dissolve or wind up a corporation and distribute its assets at the instance
of minority stockholders is strikingly illustrated by decisions repudiating
the old view, handed down in jurisdictions whose previous adherence to
that view had been undeviating. 7 These courts which have reversed
their positions together with others, which on first impression have
adopted the new rule, now constitute a majority. 8 Under this common
' The distinction between winding up and dissolution is formal only; in either
case the corporate existence is effectively terminated. See Verplanck v. Mercantile
Ins. Co., 2 Paige 438, 452 (N. Y. 1831).
'The first case to hold to the contrary was decided in 1892. Miner v. Belle
Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N. W. 218 (1892).
' The first statute of this kind was enacted in 1848. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 45, §5 (8)
(1848). The earliest enactment in this country was prior to 1868. W. VA. CoDE
c. 53, §57 (1868).
'The appointment of a temporary receiver is a common example of a less dras-

tic measure of relief.
Hardon v. Newton, 11 Fed. Cas. 500, No. 6,054 (C. C. Conn. 1878); Wheeler
v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197, 32 N. E. 420, 17 L. R. A. 818 (1892) ;
Bayless v. Orne, Freem. Ch. 161 (Miss. 1840) ; Verplanck v. Mercantile Ins. Co.,
1 Edw. Ch. 84 (N. Y. 1831); Strong v. McCogg, 55 Wis. 624, 13 N. W. 895
(1882).
'See Note, 43 A. L. R. 242, 288 (1926).
SEg., compare the following cases with cases from the same jurisdictions
cited in note 5 supra: Potter v. Victor Page Motors Corp., 300 Fed. 885 (D. Conn.
1924); Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co. v. Middendorf, 171 Ky. 771, 188 S. W. 790
(1916) ; Brent v. B. E. Brister Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 So. 1018 (1913);
Goodwin v. von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351, 177 N. W. 618 (1920).

' Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse, 40 CoL. L. REv. 220 (1940).
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law view it has been held that the court has power to wind up a corporation in a variety of appropriate circumstances, including, separately
or immingled, gross mismanagement, 9 deadlock, 10 fraud, 1 abandonment
of the corporate functions,'12 and failure of the corporation's principal
object or purpose. 13 Most of the jurisdictions which assert a lack of
power "in the absence of statute," along with those recognizing an inherent power, have enacted statutes specifying grounds-the aforementioned 14 and/or others' 5-upon which suit may be brought.
The power must be exercised cautiously, 16 and its exercise is prohibited where a lesser remedy would be adequate. 17 Accordingly, the
cases are legion where the courts, while acknowledging the power to
dissolve in an appropriate case, refuse to exercise it because such a case
8
has not been made out.'
In a recent Virginia case' 9 minority stockholders of a corporation,
organized for the principal purpose of conducting a leaf tobacco business, brought suit for dissolution alleging that the principal purpose had
9
E.g., Klugh v. Coronaca Milling Co., 66 S. C. 100, 44 S. E. 566 (1903).
20E.g., In re Dissolution of the Waldorf Amusement Co., 13 Ohio App. 438
(1920).
19E.g, Tower Hill-Connellsville Coke Co. of W. Va. v. Piedmont Coal Co.,
64 F. 2d 817 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 675 (1933).
"2 E..g, Central Land Co. v. Sullivan, 152 Ala. 360 44 So. 644 (1907).
"Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525, 155 Pac. 665 (1916) ; Kroger
v. Jaburg, 231 App. Div. 641, 248 N. Y. Supp. 387 (1st Dep't 1931). See Hall
v. City Park Brewing Co., 294 Pa. 127, 136-137, 143 Atl. 582, 585 (1928).
LC. CoRP. CODE §4651 (1947)
(abandonment, deadlock, fraud); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §5226 (1949) (fraud, gross mismanagement, abandonment), ILL. ANN.
STAT. c. 32, §157.86 (1935) (deadlock, fraud); LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. §1135 (1939)
(failure of objects, abandonment, deadlock); ME. REv. STAT. c. 49 §100 (1944)
(fraud, gross mismanagement); MINN. STAT. §301.49 (Henderson 1945) (failure
of objects, abandonment, fraud, deadlock, mismanagement) ; Mo. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§4997.88 (1939) (fraud, deadlock); NEv. Comp. LAWS ANN. §1648.01 (Supp.
1942) (fraud, gross mismanagement, abandonment); OHio GEN. CODE ANN. §862386 (1938) (deadlock, abandonment, failure of objects) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§1.195 (Supp. 1948) (failure of objects, abandonment, deadlock) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, §2852-1107 (1938) (failure of objects, abandonment, fraud, deadlock)
R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 116, §57 (1938), as amended, R I. Acts 1945 c. 1610 (fraud);
VA. CODE ANN. §3810b (Supp. 1948) (failure of principal purpose); WASH.
REV. STAT. ANN. §3803-50 (Supp. 1932) (failure of objects, abandonment, deadlock).
1 CAL. CoRP. CoDE §4651 (1947) (liquidation reasonably necessary to protect
stockholder's interests) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. §5226 (1949) (any good and sufficient
reason); ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 32, §157.86 (1935) (misapplication and waste of
assets); IOWA CODE §491.66 (1946) (good cause) ; ME. REV. STAT. c. 49, §100
(1944) (imminent danger of insolvency) ; Nmv. CoMP. LAWS §1648.01 (collusion,
misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance); N. D. RmV. CoDE §10-1607 (1943) (one
year suspension of ordinary business); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §1.195 (Supp.
1948) (beneficial to interests of stockholders); S. C. CODE ANN. §7725 (1942)
(nonpayment of dividends or inability to pay dividends in good faith over stated
intervals) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. §3093 (1) (1943) (sufficient cause).
" See discussion in Goodwin v. von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351, 361, 177 N. W.
618,1 7622 (1920).
Thwing v. Minowa Co., 134 Minn. 148, 158, N. W. 820 (1916).
"8E.g. Penn v. Pemberton & Penn, Inc., 189 Va. 649, 53 S. E. 2d 823 (1949).
" Penn v. Pemberton & Penn, Inc., 189 Va. 649, 53 S. E. 2d 823 (1949).
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failed. It was shown that the majority stockholders in control had
suspended the tobacco business during the war period-when that business was highly speculative-and during the postwar period of inflation,
and had invested the corporation's idle capital, profitably, in stocks and
bonds. The court held that although by the general rule, of which the
statute20 in part is declaratory, 21 a court of equity has inherent power
to dissolve a solvent corporation because of fraud or gross mismanagement or failure of the corporate purpose, dissolution was not warranted
by the facts presented. The case- is significant inasmuch as it expressly
recognizes that a court of equity has the power to dissolve independently
of statute, and that the exercise of the power depends upon the application of general principles of equity to the merits of the case.
North Carolina has provided by statute22 certain general and specific grounds upon which dissolution may be granted in suits instituted
therefor by minority stockholders. These include (1) abuse of the corporate powers to the injury of stockholders, (2) nonuser of the corporate powers for two or more consecutive years, (3) suspension of
ordinary business for want of funds, or imminent danger of insolvency,
and (4) nonpayment of dividends for certain intervals. But certain of
the grounds enumerated above, viz., fraud, gross mismanagement, deadlock, and abandonment 28 for less than a two year period, for which the
remedy is commonly available in appropriate cases in most jurisdictions,
are either excluded completely or subject to inclusion only by future
construction of the statute. Fraud very probably is an abuse of the
corporate powers within the meaning of the statute;24 but it would be
more difficult to find that the same is true of gross mismanagement
where fraud is lacking. Both deadlock and abandonment for less than
two years are distinctly without the purview of the statute, and failure
of the corporate purposes is at best only partially embraced.
The question whether in North Carolina equity has "power" to dissolve or, more accurately, will recognize its power to dissolve, in the
absence of statutorily specified circumstances, is therefore one of practical moment.
Although there are no holdings on the question, 25 there is one statement by a dissenting judge, uttered at a time when the weight of au2

VA. CODE ANN. §3810b (Supp. 1948).
" Penn v. Pemberton & Penn, Inc., 53 S.E. 2d 823, 825 (Va. 1949).
12 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§55-124, 55-125 (1943).
"' Abandonment is the critical fact; nonuser, except under statutory provision,
is merely evidence of it. Sullivan v. Central Land Co., 173 Ala. 426, 55 So. 612
(1911).
2" In one case, however, where fraud was clearly present, but where imminency
of insolvency was not so clearly present, the court, in appointing a receiver, rested
its decision on the latter basis, neglecting to construe the "abuse of power" provision. Mitchell v. Aulander Realty Co., 169 N. C. 516, 86 S.E. 358 (1915).
" Contra: Note, 34 VA. LAw REv. 56, 57 (1948).
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thority was in the process of shifting, 6to the effect that ".

settled

.

. . it is well
.. that in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary,

only the State which created the corporation can sue to dissolve it."127
Cited in support of the contention that the rule is well settled are one
treatise 2s and four North Carolina cases.2 9 The writer of the treatise
asserts that equity has, as a general rule, no power or jurisdiction to
dissolve, in the absence of statute, upon the suit of minority stockholders,3 0 but lists, with evident approbation, several exceptional cir-

cumstances (including most of the aforementioned appropriate grounds)
in which equity may properly exercise that power.3 '

Thus the writer,

by admitting the "exceptions," admits the existence of the power, but
in his statement of the "general" rule, with regard to the reason why
dissolution should not be granted in inappropriate cases, seems to be
involved in the persistent verbal confusion between the existence of the
power and the desirability of exercising it.
The dissenting statement finds even less support in the cases cited.
In two 2 of these, suits were brought by minority stockholders for dissolution on statutory grounds, but no statement appears which negates,
either expressly or by implication, equity's power in the absence of

statute. 33

The other two cases, 34 although they contain statements os-

tensibly applicable upon inspection, in fact involve suits brought by parties other than those interested in the corporation for a remedy unrelated

to dissolution, and are as distinctly irrelevant in law as in fact to the
"well settled" rule which they were cited to support.3 5
26 Compare Note, 19 IowA LAW REv. 95 (1933), with Hornstein, A Remedy
for Corporate Abuse, 40 COL. LAW REV. 220 (1940). For observations that the
rule had previously changed, see Hall v. City Park Brewing Co., 294 Pa. 127,
132-133, 143 Atl. 582, 583-584 (1928) ; Goodwin v. von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351,

358-361, 177 N. W. 618, 621-622 (1920) ; BALLENTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §253
(1927).
"7See

Kistler v. The Caldwell Cotton Mills Co., 205 N. C. 809, 814, 172 S. E.
373, 375 (1933) (dissenting opinion).
" 16 FLETCHER, CoRPoRATIoNs (1933 ed.) §8077.
29 Lasley v. Mercantile Co., 179 N. C. 575, 103 S. E. 213 (1920) ; Lasley v.
Scales, 179 N. C. 578, 103 S. E. 214 (1920) ; Bass v. Navigation Co., 111 N. C. 439,
16 S. E. 402 (1892) ; Torrence v. Charlotte, 163 N. C. 562, 80 S. E. 53 (1913).
16 FLETCHER, CoRPoRATIONs (Perm. ed.) §§8080, 8098.

16 id. §§8080, 8081, 8082, 8098.
Lasley v. Mercantile Co., 179 N. C. 575, 103 S. E. 213 (1920); Lasley v.
Scales, 179 N. C. 578, 103 S. E. 214 (1920).
" Indeed, a statement in the earlier of these two cases may be, and has been,
interpreted as a recognition of equity's power in the absence of statute. See 19
C. J. S. Corporations §1716 (1940).
"4Torrence v. Charlotte, 163 N. C. 562, 80 S. E. 53 (1913) ; Bass v. Navigation
Co., 111 N. C. 439, 16 S. E. 402 (1892).
" The later case merely quotes the pertinent statements of the earlier one. The
facts of both cases were essentially the same. The grantors of land (under eminent
domain proceedings) to the defendant corporations sued to recover the land, alleging that the existence of the corporations had been terminated, and thus their charters forfeited, by virtue of changes in the originally chartered purposes for which
the land had been taken. Thus, when the court says in Bass v. Navigation Co.,
supra, note 12, at p. 449, "It rests with the sovereign to insist upon the forfeiture
2

NOTES AND COMMENTS

1950]

Another case,3 6 wherein dissolution was granted under circumstances
encompassed by statutory provision,37 but wherein proceedings had not
been brought pursuant to the statute, might plausibly stand for the
proposition that dissolution may be granted independently of statute,
and hence for the principle that equity has power in the absence of
statute. That the action, although brought in equity, was brought on -a
statutory ground, and was for that reason3s entertained or condoned by
the court, might suggest a contrary inference.
The justice and equity of dissolution in proper cases may be founded
on principles of trust and contract. The tenet of majority rule in corporate management is qualified by an implicit trust relationship between
the directors, or the majority stockholders, and the individual stockholder. Accordingly, it is the duty of those in control to manage the
corporate affairs honestly for the benefit of all concerned-not merely
for the benefit of the majority or controlling interests.3 9 Consequently,
if the corporate objects fail, if the corporate functions are abandoned,
or if the corporation is doomed to eventual insolvency, that duty is
breached by a failure to wind up the corporation. Otherwise, the stockholder's investment would probably be subject, not merely to futile stagnation, but to the various intrigues of the controlling interests, and to
progressive dissipation in taxes and salaries.
The pertinent principle of contract is that by which one party has
the right to "rescind (e.g., withdraw from the corporation) after the
other has persistently failed to comply with his part of the contract (e.g.,
refused to act in the collective interest of the group)."40
The contention that the power can be abused is perhaps the most
persistent objection to it. But difficult as it is to foresee general consequences in matters of this kind, it would be still more difficult to see
how judicial abuses of the power, as cautiously as it has been exercised
for failure on the part of the corporation to comply with its charter .

p. 454, ".

.

. . .",

and at

. only the sovereign state itself can demand the forfeiture and assert its

right to dissolve the corporation. . .

.",

it is saying merely that the corporate exist-

ence is not subject to collateral attack by a logically disinterested party; i.e., that
as between the state and such a party, the power to dissolve rests exclusively in the
state, and has no bearing on that party's rights. The existence of the statute recognizing the right of minority stockholders to sue for dissolution in certain circumstances renders it particularly obvious that the court was not denying that right.
" Greenleaf v. Land & Lumber Co., 146 N. C. 505, 60 S. E. 424 (1908).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-124 (2) (1943) (nonuser of powers for two or more
years).
" "WAle
can perceive no good reason, however, for dismissing this action, wherein
all parties in interest are now or, under his Honor's order, will be brought into
court and the same relief awarded as if the provisions of the statute had been
complied with." Greenleaf v. Land & Lumber Co., 146 N. C. 505, 507-508, 60
S. E. 424, 425 (1908).
3oSee, e.g., Altoona Warehouse Co. v. Bynum, 242 Ala. 540, 545-546, 7 So.
2d 497, 502-503 (1942) ; Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 109-110, 114-115,
53 N. W. 218, 222, 224 (1892) ; Note, 41 MIcH L. REv. 714, 716 (1943).
" Hornstein, A Reinedey for CorporateAbuse, 40 COL. L. REv. 220, 225 (1940).
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in the past,4 1 could approach the intracorporate abuses rendered perpetrable by non-recognition or denial of the power.4 2
Thus far, the only situations to arise in which the courts have
deemed it just and equitable to decree dissolution have arisen within
the categories already mentioned. But these categories are mere collections of abuses already presented rather than inflexible limits of the
rule; so that the real reason for applying the remedy in a particular case
is now, as it was initially, that such action is just, equitable, 48 and socially desirable.
As previously noted, all the presently appropriate circumstances for
dissolution are not covered by statute in North Carolina. If they were,
then it would, presently, make no practical difference whether the court
had "inherent power" or not; in that event the question would, for the
time being, be academic. The history of the remedy, however, has
shown that the growth of circumstances warranting dissolution is concomitant with the growth and variegation of corporate activity. Assuming that this concomitancy will continue, statutory coverage of the
ground, however liberal, must assuredly lag behind the evolving demands
of justice and equity 44 It is hoped, therefore, that when confronted
with an appropriate case the court will recognize and exercise its inherent power, refusing to construe the statute as exclusive.4 5
PARKER WHEDON.

Damages-Mental Anguish-Action Arising Out of Contract
Plaintiff contracted with the defendant undertakers to bury plaintiff's deceased husband. Approximately four months after internment,
" Decisions refusing to decree dissolution, even in jurisdictions which recognize the power, disproportionately exceed the decisions granting the remedy.
'Alternative judgments to the effect that complainant be paid his pro rata
2
share of the assets (or the "fair cash value" of his stock) or that the corporation
be dissolved, may be a solution to this problem. CoNN. GEN. STAT. §5228 (1949) ;
W. VA. CODE ANN. §3093 (1943) ; Riley v. Callahan Mining Co., 28 Idaho 525,
155 Pac. 665 (1916).
"'The Companies Act of England provides for winding up where "..the court
is of opinion it is just and equitable. . . ." The Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20
Geo. V, c. 23, §168 (6).
"There is, however, one adequate statutory solution to the problem. By a
Rhode Island enactment it has been expressly provided that the grounds for dissolution specified in the statute are not to be construed as limits on the general
equity powers of the court and that the same relief may be obtained in equity.
R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 116, §§61, 62 (1938).
4' Analagous grounds for such refusal may be found in the case of it re Hotel
Raleigh, 207 N. C. 521, 528-529, 177 S. E. 648, 652 (1935), where, in a proceeding
under statute for the appointment of a receiver, the court said, "We do not hold
that, in a proper case, the superior court of this state, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, is without power to appoint a receiver of a corporation, whose
business has been improperly conducted, with resulting loss to its creditors or
stockholders, because of irreconcilable dissensions among its stockholders or directors. . . . We hold only that, in the summary proceeding provided by C. S.
§1177, the judge of the superior court is without such power."
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plaintiff discovered that the vault, during a very rainy spell of weather,
had risen about six inches above the ground level, and mud had permeated the tomb. Plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for mental
anguish caused by defendants' failure to bury her husband properly.
The trial judge instructed the jury, in part, that plaintiff's alleged injuries to be actionable must have resulted from "unlawful, willful negligence and carelessness" of defendants. The North Carolina Supreme
Court reversed, holding the case to be essentially an action for damages
for breach of contract in which a recovery for mental anguish might be
had without a showing of willful negligence.1
It is often stated as a general rule that, in actions for breach of contract, damages for mental suffering are not recoverable. In a majority
of the jurisdictions, action for breach of contract to marry are repeatedly
cited as the one exception to this general rule.2 Following the majority
rule, the Indiana Court, 3 in an action similar to the principal case, held
that an action could not be maintained for mental anguish suffered because of defendant undertaker's breach of contract in failing to have a
photograph made of plaintiff's deceased daughter before burial.
Even those jurisdictions which deny compensation for mental suffering resulting from a breach of contract will permit recovery for such
injuries in an action where the defendant is a common carrier, or an
innkeeper whose servants have insulted or abused the plaintiff who was
a passenger or a guest.4 The true basis for these decisions, however,
is the breach of a "public calling" duty, and the action sounds as much
in tort as in contract. These same jurisdictions also allow recovery of
mental anguish damages against the proprietor of a public resort (not
a "public calling") for publically ejecting a patron.5 It seems that the
prospects of recovery for mental anguish in these cases vary in direct
proportion to the number of people who would probably be witnesses to
the ejection.
1

Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 55 S. E. 2d 810 (1949).
' Many of the pertinent cases are reviewed in Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Choteau, 28 Okla. 644, 115 Pac. 879 (1911). Also see McCORMICK, DAMAGES
§145 (1935); SEmwicic ox DAMAGES §45 (9th ed. 1912); Thrush v. Fullhart,
230 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 4th 1915).
Plummer v. Hollis, 213 Ind. 43, 11 N. E. 2d 140 (1937).
The principal case cites Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind. 563, 25 N. E. 822 (1890)
(breach by undertaker of contract with next of kin to keep safely a corpse until
next of kin desired to inter same) as supporting authority. This case, however,
was overruled by Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 60 N. E.
674, 54 L. R. A. 846 (1901) which adopted the majority rule.
'Indiana Ry. v. Orr, 41 Ind. App. 426, 84 N. E. 32 (1907) (conductor gave
plaintiff wrong transfer; plaintiff subsequently ejected from another street car of
defendant's line); Frewen v. Page, 238 Mass. 499, 131 N. E. 475, 17 A. L. R.
134 (1921) ; Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N. Y. 106, 126 N. E. 647
(1920).
Aaron v. Ward, 203 N. Y. 351, 96 N. E. 736 (1911) (ejection from a public
bath house).
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North Carolina and a growing minority of jurisdictions have taken
a more liberal view and allow recovery for mental suffering in exceptional cases.
The North Carolina cases involving this question of mental anguish
damages seem to be logically divisible into actions e.x contractu and
actions ex delicto. In the cases decided prior to the principal case the
court made no such division but tended to emphasize the defendant's
negligence as the basis for its decisions even though in some instances it
was clearly a case of breach of contract. 7 The court, however, in the
principal case ruled out the allegation of negligence and based recovery
directly on breach of contract.8
AcTioNs

Ex CONTRACTU

The cases falling within the general category of contracts may be
divided into two classes, namely, actions where one of the contracting
parties suffers mental anguish as a result of the breach, and actions
where a third party beneficiary of the contract suffers mental anguish.
The principal case is representative of the first class, since here the
plaintiff was one of the two contracting parties. In contracts which
are personal in nature and are such that a breach thereof would naturally
cause grief and distress of mind, the court allows recovery.0 In such
case, it is said, the party sought to be charged is presumed to have
contracted with reference to the payment of damages of that character
in the event such damages should accrue on account of his breach of
contract.
Within the second class falls the so-called "telegraph cases" where
the telegraph company fails or delays in delivering, or erroneously transmits a message and the recipient, not a party to the contract, as a conLoy v. Reid, 11 Ala. App. 231, 65 So. 855 (1914) (defendant breached his
contract to embalm properly body of plaintiff's child; held, plaintiff entitled to
damages for mental anguish suffered because of decomposition of body prior to
burial) ; Westesen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pac. 689 (1925) (bank
breached contract to furnish plaintiff credit for trip to another state by refusing
to honor his checks upon arrival there). See Note, 6 N. C. L. Rav. 322 (1928).
• .. where other than pecuniary benefits are contracted for, other than pecuniary standards will be applied to the ascertainment of damages flowing from the
breach." Wadsworth v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 703, 8 S.W.
574, 576 (1888).
7 ".

.

. an action may lie either in contract or in tort ....

."

Penn v. Western

Union Telegraph Co., 159 N. C. 306, 309, 75 S. E. 16, 18 (1912); "It seems to
us that this action is in reality in the nature of tort for negligence. . .

."

Young

v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 370, 385, 11 S.E. 1044, 1048 (1890).
8
Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 13, 55 S. E. 2d 810, 812 (1949).
'In Thomason v. Hackney, 149 N. C. 298, 74 S. E. 1022 (1912) defendant
photographer lost films taken of plaintiff's deceased child. The mother was denied
recovery for the resulting anguish. The court, however, based its decision on
the fact that the aunt, who delivered the film to defendant, did not inform him
that she was acting as agent for the mother. Had this been done it seems clear
that recovery would have been allowed.
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sequence is subjected to mental anguish.'o It was this type of action
which introduced the first exception to the general rule in actions for
breach of contract. The Texas Court, in 1881, allowed recovery for
mental suffering in contract actions by awarding damages to a son for
mental anguish caused by the failure of the telegraph company to deliver a message announcing the death of his mother, whereby he was
prevented from being present at her burial.'1 North Carolina adopted
this exception in 1890,12 and this is still the law as to intrastate messages.' 5 If the telegraph message is sent across state lines, the federal
rule applies and a claim for damages for mental distress due to the
delay cannot be maintained by the person affected even in the courts of
a state which allows such damages. 14
ACTIONS Ex DELICTO

The cases, where no contract is involved but the action sounds in tort
only, may be divided into three groups: first, actions where mental pain
and suffering results from a willful, wanton, or intentional act; second,
actions where there has been a negligent breach of a duty, resulting in
physical injury accompanied by mental suffering; and third, actions
where there is a negligent breach of a duty resulting in mental anguish
only.
In cases where the mental pain was caused intentionally, 15 or in the
ordinary personal injury cases where there is a physical injury accompanied by mental suffering, the court has been willing to allow mental
anguish damages. Mental disturbance alone, however, where there is
10 See Green v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 136 N. C. 489, 504, 49 S. E.
165, 171 (1904) for a list of the states affirming and states repudiating the right
to recover damages for mental suffering due to negligent delay in the delivery of
telegrams.
"So Relle v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 308, 40 Am. Rep. 805
(1881).
12 Green v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 136 N. C. 489, 49 S. E. 165 (1904)
(defendant company late delivering wire informing addressee to meet sender's
young daughter upon arrival of her train; no one met her when she arrived after
midnight; recovery allowed for mental suffering and fright upon finding herself
alone and unprotected at such a late hour in a strange city despite fact that no
actual harm befell her) ; Young v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 107 N. C. 370,
11 S. E. 1044 (1890); Thompson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 107 N. C.
449, 12 S. E. 427 (1890).
13 Russ v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 222 N. C. 504, 23 S.E. 2d 681 (1943).
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S. 17, reversing 178 N. C.
146, 100 S. E. 351 (1919) (death message sent from point in North Carolina
and directed to another point in North Carolina, but routed by defendant through
an out of state office; held, interstate message, no recovery for mental anguish).
1 It seems the trial judge attempted to place the principal case in this group
since he charged the jury, in part, that plaintiff's alleged injuries to be actionable
must have resulted from "unlawful, willful negligence and carelessness" of defendants. Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N. C. 10, 13, 55 S. E. 2d 810, 812 (1949);
Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N. C. 808, 188 S. E. 625 (1936) (defendant
called plaintiff a deadbeat and yelled threats of arrest from an automobile causing
plaintiff to have miscarriage). See Note, 18 N. C. L. RFv. 71 (1939).
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16
no showing of impairment of health or loss of bodily power, cannot
1
7
serve as a basis for recovery.
The premises upon which recovery is denied where the physical
injury is lacking are (1) the difficulty of measurement, and (2) the
danger of fraudulent claims. The first objection is of doubtful validity
since the measurement of mental anguish alone is no more difficult than
its measurement accompanied by a physical injury. The second objection is also vulnerable. Courts should not refuse to hear and decide the
merits of just claims merely to avoid the possibility of fraudulent ones.
To do so is plainly an admission of their inability to detect fraud.1 8
There is one North Carolina case 19 which could be classified as an
action ex contractu or ex delicto, but perhaps better falls within the
former category. In this case the plaintiff husband was allowed to recover mental anguish damages sustained-while watching his wife suffer
as a result of improper care by defendant hospital. Even though the
court stressed negligence, the breach of contract to care for the wife
properly was lurking in the background and offered a peg upon which
the court could hang mental suffering damages.
Thus, the present state of the law seems to be that mental anguish
damages are treated as parasitic in nature and can be awarded only in
connection with a wrong, such as breach of contract or a negligent act
resulting in physical injuries, which apart from such mental suffering
constitutes a cause of action. Even if it were necessary to have such
a peg on which to hang recovery, it appears that the negligent breach
of duty without the physical injury would be substantial enough. This
is especially true in view of the fact that a technical breach of contract
was sufficient in the principal case.
The principal case represents an addition to the growing list of exceptions to the general rule disallowing recovery for mental anguish in

" See "While fright and nervousness alone, unaccompanied or followed by

physical injury, do not constitute an element of damages, if this fright and nervousness is a natural and direct result of the negligent act of the defendant and
naturally and directly causes an impairment of health or loss of bodily power,
then this would constitute an element of injury to be considered by the jury."
Sparks v. Tenn. Mineral Products Corp., 212 N. C. 211, 213, 193 S. E. 31, 33
(1937).

"7Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 32 S. E. 2d 611 (1945) ; "It
may be admitted that mental anguish, suffered in connection with a wrong which,

apart from such mental pain, constitutes a cause of action, may be a proper element of compensatory damages. But the general rule is that mental suffering,
unrelated to any other cause of action, is not alone a sufficient basis for the recovery of substantial damages." Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N. C.
120, 128, 126 S. E. 307, 312 (1925).
'a See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage 20 Micn. L. REv.
497, 505 (1922) where it is contended: ". . . skilled medical men have developed
a technique for distinguishing the real sufferer from the fraudulent imposter."
1" Bailey v. Long, 172 N. C. 661, 90 S. E. 809 (1916); But cf. Benevolent
Association v. Neal, 194 N. C. 401, 139 S. E. 841 (1927) where a mother was

refused mental anguish damages resulting from alleged malpractice of defendant

on her son, the court held such damages to be too speculative and remote.
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breach of contract actions. As in the case of any new development in
the law, the process is one of slow and cautious growth, but at some
future time the "general rule" may be swallowed up by the exceptions
and the exceptions may become the rule.
CHARLEs E. KNox.
Domestic Relations-Custody of ChildRights of Natural Parent
One of the greatest responsibilities that can be placed upon a court
is that of determining the proper custodian of a child. This is not a field
of the law suited to the application of fixed rules or maxims, but rather
one in which the courts should carefully weigh all the individual and
social interests involved. These include the ultimate welfare of the
child, the natural emotions of the parent and the interest of the state.The North Carolina Supreme Court in the recent case of In re Cranford2 appears to have reached its decision without giving careful thought
to all the individual and social interests involved. In that case, a habeas
corpus proceeding was instituted by the mother of an illegitimate child
to regain the child's custody from the mother's aunt. The lower court
found that shortly after the birth of the child, the mother and the child
went to the home of the mother's aunt and remained there until the
mother's subsequent marriage to a person not the father of the child;
that the mother then established residence elsewhere, abandoning the
child by surrendering it to the unqualified custody of the aunt and asserting that she would make no further claim to it. It was further found
that the aunt was a fit person to have the custody of the child and that
her home was a proper place to rear it; and that the mother of the child
was a woman of good character and that her home was a proper place
for the child to visit. Upon these findings the lower court awarded the
custody and control of the child to the aunt, allowing the mother to visit
the child at stated periods.
The Supreme Court on appeal reversed on the grounds that they
were not bound by the lower court's finding that there was an abandonment by the mother, and that the natural parent, unless shown to be
unfit, has a legal right to the possession of the child.
One wonders what effect this and like decisions8 will have on the
willingness of persons to take helpless children into their homes in the
1Sce Commonwealth v. Lindsay, 156 Pa. Super. 560, 562, 40 A. 2d 881, 882
(1944) ("Lacking prescience, the choice is always difficult") ; Commonwealth v.
Shannon,
107 Pa. 56 S. E.557,
Atl. 352 (1933).
2231 N. C. 91, Super.
2d 164
35 (1949).
'In another recent case, 1n re Adoption of Doe, 231 N. C. 1, 56 S. E. 2d 8
(1949), the mother of an illegitimate child consented to its adoption; she married
the reputed father; a temporary adoption order was entered; and then the mother
revoked her consent. The court held that the child must be returned to the parents
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future. They might well fear that the child will be taken from them
after they have cared for and become attached to it. The willingness
of persons to take in and provide for helpless children affects the welfare of the child and society. There are many institutions provided to
care for these unfortunates; but beneficial and commendable as they
may be, they can never take the place of private homes where, from close
personal contact and cooperation, mutual love and affection develop
4
between the children and those persons standing in loco parentis.
At common law, the child was regarded somewhat as a chattel and
the property interest of the parent was paramount to the welfare of the
child. 5 The modern American rule, however, is contrary to that common law principle and now the child's welfare is said to be controlling.0
As stated by Roscoe Pound, 7 "Recent legislation and judicial decisions
have changed the old attitude of the law with respect to dependent members of the household. Courts no longer make the rights of parents with
respect to children the chief basis of their decisions. The individual
interests of parents which used to be the one thing regarded has come
to be almost the last thing regarded as compared with the interests of
the child and the interests of society. In other words, here also social
interests are chiefly regarded."
In the principal case, the preferred status of the parent prevailed.
Modern courts, although recognizing the welfare of the child as the
ultimate consideration, tend to prefer the natural parents. The basis
of such preference is a presumption that the natural affections of the
parent for its child will result in the child receiving better care from
the parents than from strangers.8 Still, such a presumption is rather
effectively rebutted where the parent has failed to care tenderly for the
child in the past.9 Therefore, when a parent voluntarily parts with the
custody of the child for an unreasonable length of time and allows another to perform the parental duties that the parent should have per"See Waite, The Adoption and Rearing of Children, 21 PA. B. A. Q. 40, 43
(1949).
Commonwealth v. Tracy, 155 Pa. Super. 257, 38 A. 2d 405 (1944).
'See Keener v. Keener, 139 Tenn. 211, 221, 201 S. W. 779, 782 (1918) ("The
dominant thought is that children are not chattels, but intelligent and moral beings,
and that as such their -welfare and their happiness is a matter of first consideration.") ; Seeley v. Seeley, 30 App. D. C. 191 (1907), cert. denied, 209 U. S. 544
(1908) (Rationale: the state must perpetuate itself and good citizenship is essential
to that end.) ; Commonwealth v. Stephens, 127 Pa. Super. 188, 193 Atl. 80 (1937) ;
State v. Postletehwaite, 106 W. Va. 383, 145 S. E. 738 (1928) ; MADDEN, PERSONS
AND DOMEsTic RELATO Ns 371 (1931)- and cases cited.
THE SPIRIT OF THE Co m oN LAW 189 (1921).
' Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); see Buchanan v. Buchanan, 93 Kan.
'PouND,

613, 616, 144 Pac. 840, 841 (1914) ; MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOiuESTic
372 (1931).
'Peese v. Gullerman, 51 Tex. Civ. App. 39, 110 S. W. 196 (1908).
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formed, that parent thereby seriously impairs his right to have the child's
custody awarded him by judicial decree.10
It is somewhat surprising that the North Carolina Court based its
decision on the sole ground that the natural right of the parent is superior, absent proof of the mother's unfitness, inasmuch as North Carolina has frequently recognized and followed the almost unanimous
American rule that the welfare of the child is the controlling factor.1 1
In fact, the best interest of the child has prevailed over the natural right
of the parent in many North Carolina cases even though the parent was
not shown to be unfit.12
Recognizing the welfare of the child as the objective to be obtained,
no consideration bearing on its welfare should be overlooked. In the
principal case, there is no indication that the court considered the length
of time the child was in the custody of the aunt-a vital factor. "It is
an obvious fact, that the ties of blood weaken, and ties of companionship strengthen, by lapse of time; and the prosperity and welfare of the
child depend on the number and strength of these ties, as well as on
the ability to do all which the promptings of these ties compel.' 3
In addition to considering the length of time the aunt had custody
of the child, the court should have weighed the conduct of the parties
during that period.' 4 The actions of the mother during that period
10 Commonwealth v. Stephens, 127 Pa. Super. 188, 193 Atl. 80 (1937) ; Hoxie
v. Potter, 16 R. I. 374, 17 Att. 129 (1888) ; Cunningham v. Barnes, 37 W. Va. 746,
17 S. E.308 (1893).
1 "It is also held with us in well considered cases, and they are in accord With
the rule now generally prevailing, that the right of the parents is not universal
and absolute; but even as between individuals, the same may be modified and

disregarded when it is made to appear that the welfare of the child clearly requires
it." Atkinson v. Downing, 175 N. C. 244, 95 S. E. 487 (1918) ; Hardee v. Mitchell,
230 N. C. 40, 51 S. E. 2d 884 (1949) ; Ridenhour v. Ridenhour, 225 N. C. 508,
35 S. E. 2d 617 (1945) ; Walker v. Walker, 224 N. C. 751, 32 S. E. 2d 318 (1944) ;
Pappas v. Pappas and Elkin v. Pappas, 208 N. C. 220, 179 S. E. 661 (1935) ; Clegg
v. Clegg, 186 N. C. 28, 118 S. E. 824 (1923) ; In re Rosa Hamilton, 182 N. C. 44,
108 S. E. 385 (1921) ; Brickwell v. Hines, 179 N. C. 254, 102 S. E. 309 (1920) ;
In re Alderman, 157 N. C. 507, 73 S. E. 126 (1911) ; In re Constance Turner, 151
N. C. 474, 66 S. E. 431 (1909).
"Atkinson v. Downing, supra note 11; Tyner v. Tyner, 206 N. C. 776, 175
S. E. 144 (1934) ; In re Daisey Bell Warren, 178 N. C. 43, 100 S. E. 76 (1919).
Contra: In re Jones, 153 N. C. 312, 69 S. E. 217 (1910).
In the principal case the court based its decision, that the mother was not
shown to be unfit, on the fact that the lower court found her of proper character
for the child to visit. In Tyner v. Tyner the lower court found the mother to
be a woman of good character, and a proper and suitable person for the children
to associate with, but nevertheless failed to find that she was a suitable person for
their custody.
1 Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881)
(leading case).
1.
. . the conduct of the father, during nearly the whole life of the child,
furnishes reason for supposing that he surrendered his rights over the child by a
tacit understanding, if not by an express agreement. He has, for eight years or
more, been able to retake the child, and has made no offer to do so. No demand
or offer has been made that he should contribute to her support. His present
assertion of his rights is in consequence of -what he deems an unreasonable refusal
of a different request. By his own acquiesence he has allowed the affections on
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might have amounted to a willful disregard for the welfare of her
child. 1 On the other hand, a study of her conduct might have shown
that the natural ties of affection were present, but that a temporary
relinquishment of custody was necessary for economic or other justi16
fiable reasons.
Another factor the court failed to take into account was the attitude
and character of the husband of the child's mother, which would seem
to have a direct and important bearing on the future welfare of the
7
child.1
Many courts are influenced by the preference or desire of the child
if the child has reached the "age of discretion."' 8 The court listens to
the wishes of the child because it is material for the court to understand
them, that it may be better prepared to exercise its discretion wisely. It
is not the whim or caprice of the child which the court respects, but its
feelings, its attachments, its reasonable preference and its probable contentment. 10 The "age of discretion" is fixed by statute in some states, 20
but ordinarily it is left to the judgment of the trial court which determines it by appraising the capacity, information, intelligence and judg21
ment of the child.
Other vital elements that should enter into the determination of the
award 22 are the health, 23 age, 24 sex, 2 ; pecuniary prospects, 20 education
both sides to become engaged in a manner he could not but have anticipated, and
which cannot be altered without risking the happiness and interests of his child.
He has allowed the parties to go on for years in the belief that his legal rights
were waived. Therefore he is not now in a position to require the interference
of the court in favor of a controlling legal right on his part, against the rights,
such as they are, the feelings, and the interests of the parties." Hoxie v. Potter,
16 R. I. 374, 17 Atl. 129 (1888).
. Society v. Davis, 211 Ala. 344, 100 So. 325 (1924); Lancey v. Shelley, 232
Iowa 178, 2 N. W. 2d 781 (1942) ; Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650 (1881).
"Wood v. Shaw, 92 Kan. 70, 139 Pac. 1165 (1914).
1 This factor would seem to be especially relevant here inasmuch as the mother
of the child had already married at the time she relinquished custody to the aunt.
See In re Daisey Bell Warren, 178 N. C. 43, 100 S. E. 76 (1919) ; Bonnett v.
Bonnett, 61 Iowa 199, 16 N. W. 91 (1883) (court considered fact that stepfather
was under no legal obligation to provide for child). See State v. Dewey, 195 N. C.
628, 143 S. E. 216 (1928) (stepfather has no legal obligation to provide for
child).
19See Harris v. Harris, 115 N. C. 587, 589, 20 S. E. 187, 188 (1894) ; Spears
v. Snell, 74 N. C. 210, 215 (1876); Bridges v. Matthews, 276 Ky. 59, 122 S. W.
2d 1021 (1938) ; Cummings v. Bird, 230 Ky. 296, 19 S. W. 2d 959 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 319 Pa. 183, 179 Atl. 808 (1935).
19 HuRD, HABEAS CORPUS 529 (1858).
"0 E.g. OHio GEN. CODE ANN. §8033 (1938) (14 years).
21 HURD, HABEAS CoRpus 532 (1858).
22 Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAW AND CONTE7tP. PROD.
721,"in
734 re
(1944).
Rosa Hamilton, 182 N. C. 44, 108 S. E. 385 (1921); See Note, 48
A. L. R. 137 (1927) and cases cited.
2, In the principal case, there is no mention of the age of the child. The parent
would seem to have a stronger case where the child is of tender years. See Scog-
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and development, 27 and religious welfare of the child28 and in addition,

the character and feelings of the parties desiring custody.29 Furthermore, a decision in this type of case involves judicial discretion. Being
familiar with the surrounding circumstances, hearing the testimony,
seeing the witnesses, and interviewing the child are all matters which
place the trial court in a better position to determine what is for the
child's best interest, and its decision should not be lightly overturned.3 0
In the light of the above discussion, it is submitted that a parent
should not be denied the custody of his child without a good and sufficient cause, but in determining whether such cause does in fact exist,
all factors affecting the welfare of the child should be considered.
RODDEY M. LIGON, JR.

Federal Jurisdiction-Removal-Separate and Independent
Claim or Cause of Action

Suit divisibility as a basis for removal to the federal courts has long
been available to non-resident defendants who were joined with resident
defendants in a single action. The act of July 27, 1866, brought into
being the right of these defendants to remove on the ground of "separable controversy."' At this time the case was split into two parts, with
the part involving the non-resident defendant removed to the federal
court and the part involving the resident defendant left in the state
court. It was not until the act of March 3, 1875, that the removal of
the entire suit was allowed where a "separable controversy" was found
to exist. 2 Under the last act the court was permitted, upon removal, to
remand in whole or in part as justice required. This last revision continued in substantially the same form until September 1, 1948. 3 During
gins v. Scoggins, 80 N. C. 319 (1897); Haskell v. Haskell, 152 Mass. 16, 24 N. E.
859 (1890).
" See Scoggins v. Scoggins, supra note 24, where three girls awarded to mother
and one boy to father.
- Lancey v. Shelley, 232 Iowa 187, 2 N. W. 2d 781 (1942) ; Dunkin v. Siefert,
123 Iowa 64, 98 N. W. 558 (1904) ; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 93 Kan. 613, 144 Pac.
840 (1914) ; Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Cuistody, 10 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PRoB. 721, 733 (1944).
"'See Spears v. Snell, 74 N. C. 210, 213 (1876); Dunkin v. Siefert, supra
note 26.
" Atkinson v. Downing, 175 N. C. 244, 95 S. E. 487 (1918) ; Moore v. Dozier,
128 Ga. 90, 57 S. E. 110 (1907) ; Friedman, The ParentalRight to Control the
Religious Education of a Child, 29 HAxv. L. R. 485, 488 (1916).
20 Sheers v. Stein, 75 Wis. 44, 43 N. W. 728 (1889).
Pappas v. Pappas and Elkin v. Pappas, 208 N. C. 220, 197 S. E. 661 (1935);
Clegg v. Clegg, 186 N. C. 28, 118 S. E. 824 (1923); In re Rosa Gray Hamilton,
182 N. C. 44, 108 S. E. 385 (1921) ; Stokes v. Cogdell, 153 N. C. 181, 69 S. E. 65
(1910) ; Pra v. Gherardini, 34 N. Mex. 587, 286 Pac. 828 (1930).
'14 STAT. 306 (1866).
18 STAT. 470 (1875).
136 STAT. 1094 (1911). "And when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and
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this period the question of whether a "separable controversy" was contained in a given action continually afforded one of the most perplexing
problems of federal jurisdiction.
One approach to the problem of determining the existence of a
separable controversy within a suit has been on the basis of parties.4
According to this view, when the joinder of defendants is permissive
rather than necessary, then the nonresident defendant so joined may
remove the whole case on the ground that it contains a separable controversy as to him. Thus, in a proceeding against several insurers who
were members of an association which insured the plaintiff's property,
the non-resident defendants were allowed to remove the entire case to
the federal courts. 5
During the process of development of removal jurisdiction under
the separable controversy statute, the courts evidently believed that in
certain types of actions all of the case should not be removed to the
federal courts. Thus they devised the "separate controversy" concept,
which allowed the federal courts to retain only a part of the case and to
remand the remainder. The cases so split up were those which involved
joinder of distinct claims and not merely joinder of parties.0 Hence,
an action by a railroad corporation to condemn land for a right of way
was separate as to the claim or cause of action against each individual
landowner of tracts along the way. The non-resident defendant landowners were allowed to remove that portion of the case as between themselves and the railroad, but the remainder of the case was remanded to
7
the state court.
which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the
defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the
district court of the United States for the proper district." This statute was
familiarly known as the "separable controversy" statute. For historical sketch,

see 3 MOORE,
'3 MooRE,

FEDERAL PRACtiCE
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE

§101.02 (2d ed. 1948).
§101.06 (2d ed. 1948).

'Des Moines Elev. & Grain Co. v. Underwriter's Grain Ass'n., 63 F. 2d 103
(8th Cir. 1933); cf. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n. v. Felt, 150 F. 2d 227 (5th
Cir. 1945) (action brought in alternative against three insurance carriers because
uncertain as to who was employer at time of worker's accident); Branchville
Motor Co. v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 27 F. 2d 631 (E. D. S. C. 1928)
(suit against surety on bond joined with action in tort against insured's employee).
For excellent discussion see Note, The Content of "Separable Controversy" for
Purpose of Removal to Federal Courts, 36 CoL. L. Rxv. 788 (1936).
'3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4, §101.06.
"Deepwater Ry. v. Western Pocanhontas Coal & Lumber Co., 152 Fed. 824
(C. C. S. D. W. Va. 1907) ; cf. Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F. 2d 1023
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 539 (1931) (two causes of action joined, first
based on dishonor of plaintiff's check, second on refusal to pay own draft) ; Little
Six Oil Co. v. Noble, 17 F. 2d 728 (5th Cir. 1927) (action against contracting
party and one who has assumed his obligation) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Gregory
Hill Gold Mining Co., 5 F. 2d 705 (M. D. Ala. 1925) (condemnation proceedings); Wright v. Ankeny, 217 Fed. 988 (W. D. Wash. 1914) (liability of each
subscribing stockholder of insolvent corporation on stock subscription) ; Manufacturer's Comm. Co. v. Brown Alaska Co., 148 Fed. 308 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1906) (contracts and liability of maker of promissory note and several indorsers
thereon are separate and distinct).
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Moreover, an important procedural rule had been developed under
this statute. Where under the state law s the plaintiff was allowed to
allege the liability of the defendants jointly, such as in the joint tortfeasor and master-servant cases, and he elected to do so, then the joint
allegation made it unnecessary to determine whether the suit could be
removed on the ground of separable or separate controversy. Such
joint allegation effectively barred consideration of the question of removability under the removal statutes prior to 1948, and the case was
deemed nonremovable. 9
In view of the uncertainty and the confusion caused by the language
of the old statute, Congress has adopted a new removal statute, which
provides that:
"Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued on alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all
issues therein, or, at its discretion, may remand all matters not
within its original jurisdiction."'1o
Thus Congress has abolished "separable controversy" as a ground of
removal and has substituted therefor "a separate and independent claim
11
or cause of action."
The most significant result of the few decisions under the new statute
has been the apparent retention of the procedural rule under the old
statute that an allegation of concurrent negligence and joint liability bars
removal. Only two decisions, from the same district court, have been
' There is a conflict as to whether it is obligatory on the part of the federal
courts to follow state statutes and decisions in such cases. It has been held that
a state court decision on the removability to a federal court of a cause of action
pending before it, is not binding upon the federal court sitting in that jurisdiction; but a state court decision as to the nature of the obligation under the state
laws, as joint or several, which affects the right to remove, must be accepted by
the federal courts. Fournet v. De Vibliss, 24 F. Supp. 60 (W. D. La. 1938). Cases
collected in Note, 140 A. L. R. 733, 735 (1942).
0 "If a plaintiff alleges that the concurrent negligence of the railroad company
and its employee, Johnson, was the cause of his injury, he has a right to join
them in one action. If he elects to do so, it supplies no ground for removal because he might have sued them separately." Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Dowell,
229 U. S. 102 (1912); Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534 (1939); Hay v.
May Department Stores Co., 271 U. S.318 (1926) ; McAllister v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry., 243 U. S.320 (1917) ; American Car and Foundry Co. v. Kettlehake, 236
U. S. 311 (1914); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Cockrell, Administrator, 232 U. S.
146 (1913) ; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schwyart, 227 U. S. 184 (1912) ; Chicago, B & Q. R. R. v. Willard, 220 U. S. 413 (1911); Southern Ry. v. Miller,
217 U. S.209 (1910) ; Illinois C. R. R. v. Sheegog, 215 U. S.308 (1909) ; Wecker
v. National Enameling Co., 204 U. S.176 (1906) ; Cincinnati, N. 0. & Tex. Pac.
Ry. v. Bohon, 200 U. S.221 (1905); Alabama & G. So. Ry. v. Thompson, 200
U. S.206 (1905); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Dixon, 179 U. S.131 (1900); Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Martin, 178 U. S.245 (1899).
0 28 U. S. C. §1441(c) (1949).
" For further discussion of the effect of §1441 (c), see MOORE, COmENTARY
ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE §0.03(37)
(1949).
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opposed to this view. In Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co., the district court said, ". . . a separate and independent claim or
cause of action had been alleged against the defendant tortfeasor," and
allowed removal.' 2 This court ignored completely the concurrent negligence allegation. It followed up this decision with a like result in
Buckholt v. Dow Chemical Co., another joint tort-feasor case.' 3 The
court of appeals reversed the district judge in Bentley v. Halliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co., and remanded the case to the state court, saying, "Joint liability for the whole tort negatives the idea of a separate
and independent claim."' 14 Four district courts agreed with this latter
view under the new statute. 1'
In Butler Manufacturing Co. v. Wallace
& Tiernan Sales Corp., the district court in the absence of an allegation
of joint liability found it implied in the facts as set out in the complaint
and remanded the entire case to the state court. The district judge
said:
"Only separate and independent claims joined in one action,
which is sued on alone and within the original jurisdiction of
United States District Courts are now subject to removability.
In the instant case, it appears that the complaint charges a cause
of action for damages caused at a singular time and place by
separate wrongful acts of defendants. In light of the substantive
law of the State of Missouri the complaint can only be construed
to charge joint and several liability against the defendants. Consequently, no right of removal exists because of the existence of
'a separate and independent claim or cause of action' as asserted
6
by the removing defendent.'
Therefore the same procedural rule that applied to such cases under
the old statute applies equally under the new.
There was clearly an intent to change the right of removal under
this new statute by abolishing separable controversies and substituting
"a single and independent claim or cause of action." The federal court
under the old statute allowed removal in Texas Employers Insurance
Ass'n. v. Felt where three insurance carriers, two resident and one nonresident, were being sued in the alternative, since it was uncertain which
was liable under th Workman's Compensation Act.' 7 Now under the
new statute it seems evident that this removal would not be allowed
inasmuch as there was only one claim or cause of action asserted against
the defendants. In a joint tortfeasor case clearly there is but one cause
1281 F. Supp. 323 (S. D. Tex. 1948).
1281 F. Supp. 463 (S. D. Tex. 1948).

174 F. 2d 788 (5th Cir. 1949).
Board of Directors v. Whiteside, 87 F. Supp. 69 (W. D. Ark. 1949) ; Robinson v. Missouri Pac. Tran. Co., 85 F. Supp. 235 (W. D. Ark. 1949); Smith v.
Waldemar, 85 F. Supp. 36 (E. D. Tenn. 1949); English v. Atlantic C. L. Ry.,
80 F. Supp. 681 (E. D. S. C. 1948).
" 82 F. Supp. 635 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
17 150 F. 2d 227 (5th Cir. 1945).
i,

1"
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of action. It appears that under the prior statute, if the liability was
severally alleged, rather than jointly, a non-resident defendant could
remove the case. The new statute, however, would not allow removal
since there is only one claim or cause of action stated. Apparently it
is the intent of the revisors of the statute that a single claim sued on
may no longer be separated into parts so as to effect a removal of a
single claim or cause of action from a state to a federal court. In this
respect, the new statute may result in a decrease in the volume of federal litigation.' 8 A clear example of the type of case applying the new
statute, in which there are related but separate causes of action, is
McFadden v. Grace Lines, Inc.19 The complaint stated eleven causes
of action arising out of similar claims on shipments made by plaintiffs,
some on different dates. The district court, in its discretion, refused
to remand any of the causes and tried the entire case.
While the new statute may prove to be an improvement over the
earlier one, still the use of the language "separate and independent claim
or cause of action" leaves much to be desired in the matter of clarity.
What is mant by a "cause of action" has long been the subject of earnest
debate among the profession. 20 As one writer has said, "A lengthy period
of uncertainty will almost inevitably result from the adoption of
1441(c). '"21 The substantial rights of parties should not depend on
the unpredictable tests established under an uncertain statute, and hence
the need for a clearer statute is apparent. 22 Either a denial of the right
of removal, absent complete diversity between the parties,2 3 or a defini18 H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 134 (1947).
But see Wills and
Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdictionand Procedure,9 0rno
ST. L. J. 257 (1948), where it is said, "In another respect, however, section 1441
(c)may increase the amount of federal litigation in that it will permit removal of
suits containing entirely separate and independent causes of action, which are now
remanded under the separable controversy limitation. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that total federal litigation may increase."
1 82 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. N. Y. 1948).
"McCaskill, The Elusive Cause of Action, 4 U. OF CHi. L. Rav. 281 (1937);
Wheaton, The Code Cause of Action, 22 CORN. L. Q. 1 (1936) ; Clark, The Cause
of Action, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 354 (1934) ; Harris, What Is a Cause of Action?, 16
CALIF'. L. Rxv. 459 (1928).
21 Wills and Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Relizoval .urisdiction and
Procedure, 9 OHio ST.L. J.257 (1948).
" "The most expedient and sensible approach to the separable controversy problem, however, would be to deny removal to diversity cases except where federal
jurisdiction exists under the rule in Strawbridge v. Curtiss [infra note 23] which
allows federal jurisdiction in diversity cases only where every plaintiff could sue
every defendant in the federal courts." Note, 42 ILL. L. REv. 105 (1948). Another
view is that "it would seem distinctly preferable to retain the separable controversy for the present. We have a large number of cases construing the clause.
Although these cases cannot be harmonized, they can at least be classified." Wills
and Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9
Oio ST. L. J.257 (1948).
"This would be a return to the original grounds for removal as set out in
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. 1806) (All parties on one side of
the suit [plaintiffs] must be diverse in citizenship from all the parties on the other
[defendants] in order to have removal to the federal courts). See note 22 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

tion of a "separate and independent claim or cause of action" for the
purposes of this statute, may lend certainty to this disputed area and
serve to effectuate the original intent of the revisors.
J. C. JoHNsoN, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Tort LiabilityGovernmental and Proprietary Functions
A municipal corporation is legally limited in its acts to those which
are for a public purpose.' The liability of a municipality in tort depends
upon whether the act complained of, even though committed in an
undertaking for a public purpose, is characterized as governmental or
proprietary. If the undertaking is characterized as governmental, then
there is no liability unless imposed by statute; if it is characterized as
proprietary, then the municipality is liable as any other corporation
would be.

2

In the case of Rhodes v. Asheville,3 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina was faced with the problem of determining in which of these
two categories the operation of a municipally owned airport fell. Plaintiff's intestate had been fatally wounded by a watchman employed at
the airport. In a resulting action for wrongful death, the municipal
defendants maintained that N. C. GEN. STAT. §63-50 (Supp. 1947) de-

clared such an operation to be a public, mtnicipal, governmental function
and that therefore no action would lie.4 Their demurrer was overruled

and they appealed. The Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court's
decision, held that the statute only declared such operation to be for a
public purpose. The Court then classified the undertaking as proprie1Nash v. Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 42 S. E. 2d 209 (1947) ; Airport Authority
v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 1, 36 S. E. 2d 211 (1944) ; Reidsville v. Slade, 224 N. C. 48,
29 S.
E. 2d 215 (1944).
2
Millar v. Wilson, 222 N. C. 340, 23 S. E. 2d 42 (1942) ; Parks v. Princeton,
217 N. C. 361, 8 S. E. 2d 217 (1940) ; Hodges v. Charlotte, 214 N. C. 737, 200
S. E. 889 (1938) ; Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N. C. 504, 193 S. E. 814 (1937) ; Broome
v. Charlotte, 208 N. C. 729, 182 S. E. 325 (1935) ; Cathey v. Charlotte, 197 N. C.
309, 148 S. E. 426 (1929); Scales v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 469, 126 S. E.
543 (1925) ; James v. Charlotte, 183 N. C. 630, 112 S. E. 423 (1922) ; Snider v.
High Point, 168 N. C. 608, 85 S. E. 15 (1915); Harrington v. Greenville, 159
N. C. 632, 75 S. E. 849 (1912) ; Mcllhenney v. Wilmington, 127 N. C. 146, 37
S. E. 187 (1900).
Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N. C. 134, 52 S. E. 2d 371 (1949).
' "The acquisition of any lands for the purpose of establishing airports or other
air navigation facilities; the acquisition of airport protection privileges; the acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance,
equipment and operation of airports and other air navigation facilities, and the
exercise of any other powers herein granted to municipalities, are hereby declared
to be public, governmental and municipal functions exercised for a public purpose
and matters of public necessity, and such lands and other property, easements and
privileges acquired and used by such municipalities in the manner and for the
purposes enumerated in this article, shall are are hereby declared to be acquired
and used for public, governmental and municipal purposes and as a matter of public necessity." N. C. GEN. STAT. §63-50 (Supp. 1947).
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tary which would render the municipality liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.5
The holding of the Court, excluding any consideration of the statute,
is in line with the weight of authority in this country. Of the ten courts
other than North Carolina which have passed upon this point, seven
have held the operation of an airport by a municipality to be a proprietary function.0 Of these only one was faced with a statute pertinent
to the situation here considered. The statute involved provided for
municipal immunity, but the Texas court held this to be invalid unde
both the Federal and state Constitutions. 7
In the other three jurisdictions the courts held the operation of an
airport was a governmental function. 8 Each of these cases, however,
involved statutes which expressly gave immunity to the municipalities.
In Tennessee the court held that a statute granting municipal immunity
was constitutional. 9
The North Carolina Court was faced with an operation which in
and of itself had been classified as proprietary at common law, and yet
seemingly was declared to be governmental by statute. The Court
had previously held that in the final analysis the determination of
whether a particular undertaking is for a public purpose is for the
court and not for the legislature. 1° It had also previously held that
the operation of an airport was for a public purpose."1 Therefore,
under the Court's ruling in the principal case, it would seem that
the statute adds nothing to the existing law in this state. As the statute
now stands, it is simply a legislative attempt to declare a particular
undertaking to be a public purpose, a function which the court has said
the legislature could not exercise. As was pointed out in the Court's
opinion, only in those jurisdictions having statutes has immunity been
granted. The statute in this state indicates that the undertaking is
a public, municipal, governmental function exercised for a public
purpose... ." Granted that the statutes in the other jurisdictions were
' The case was settled for $9,000 and costs. The News and Observer, Nov. 15,
1949,
0 p. 6, col. 1.
Mayor and Council v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 122 F. 2d 385 (4th Cir. 1941);
Mobile v. Lartigue, 23 Ala. App. 479, 127 So. 257 (1930) ; Pignet v. Santa Monica,
29 Cal. App. 2d 286, 84 P. 2d 166 (1938); Coleman v. Oakland, 110 Cal. App.
715, 295 P. 59 (1930); Peavey v. Miami, 146 Fla. 629. 1 So. 2d 614 (1941);
Blackwell v. Lee, 178 Okl. 338, 62 P. 2d 1219 (1936) ; Mollencop v. Salem, 139
Ore. 137, 8 P. 2d 783, 83 A. L. R. 315 (1932) ; Christopher v. El Paso, 98 S. W.
2d 394 (Tex. 1936).
Christopher v. El Paso, 98 S. W. 2d 394 (Tex. 1936).
8 Mayor and Aldermen v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S. E. 63 (1936) ; Abbott
v. Des Moines, 230 Iowa 494, 298 N. W. 649, 138 A. L. R. 120 (1941); Stocker
v. Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S. W. 2d 339, 124 A. L. R. 345 (1939).
' Stocker v. Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S. W. 2d 339, 124 A. L. R. 345

(1939).
"0Nash v. Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 42 S. E. 2d 209 (1947) ; Briggs v. Raleigh,
195 N. C. 223, 141 S.E. 597 (1928).
"' Turner v. Reidsville, 224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. 2d 211 (1944).
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more specific, the use of the term governmental function usually carries
with it a well defined meaning. Regardless, the Court in an unanimous
decision held that the legislature intended the statute only as a declaration that such an undertaking was for a public purpose.
Following this decision the municipal defendants petitioned for a
rehearing on the basis that neither of the parties sought a construction
of the statute but that the defendants had merely asked the Court to
give effect to the statute as plainly intended by the legislature. The
Court in denying this petition said that "unquestionably" the legislature
intended that such an undertaking was to be in furtherance of a governmental function, but that the determination of such was for the courts
and not for the legislature. 12 The Court in explanation of its prior
opinion said that the construction placed upon the language used in the
statute was ".... to bring it within the legislative authority of the General Assembly and make it consistent with the validity of the statute in
which it is used." The Court did not, however, attempt to explain why
it suggested in its former opinion that it might be a wise policy to
exempt municipalities from liability in such a situation but that this
".... should be expressly granted by the Legislature, rather than by judicial decree." From these statements it would seem that if the General
Assembly intends to grant immunity, it cannot do so by merely declaring a particular undertaking to be a governmental function; and
whether an express legislative grant of immunity, though the function
be proprietary, is constitutional, quaere?18
KENNETH R. HOYLE.
Pleading-Wrongful Death Statute-Allegation That Action
Is Brought within One Year
There has been considerable confusion, under the North Carolina
Wrongful Death Statute,' as to the necessity for a specific allegation
in a complaint that the action is brought within one year from the
death. 2 In a long line of decisions 3 the statutory requirement that an
action for wrongful death must be instituted within one year after the
1. Rhodes

v. Asheville, 230 N. C. App. (1949).

" Compare Christopher v. El Paso, 98 S. W. 2d 394 (Tex. 1936) (unconstitutional), wdth Stocker v. Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S.W. 2d 339, 124 A. L. R.

345 (1949) (constitutional) ; cf.: Mack v. Charlotte, 181 N. C. 383, 107 S. E. 244
(1921) (grant of immunity constitutional where governmental function).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943) ("... an action . . . to be brought within
one year after such death.").
2See N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943), Anno.: II, Limitation of the Action
("Hence it must be alleged and proved by the plaintiff to make out a cause of
. . ."); MCINTOSH, N. C. PRAcrICE AND PROCEDURE §196 (1929) ("The
plaintiff should allege and prove that the action is within the time specified.")

action.

16 Am. Jun., Death §286 (1938) ; 107 A. L. R. 1049.
'Wilson v. Chastain, 230 N. C. 390, 53 S.E. 2d 290 (1949); McCoy v. Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co., 229 N. C. 57, 47 §. E. 2d 532 (1948) ; Webb v. Eggleston,
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death has been stated to be a condition annexed to the plaintiff's cause
of action, and not a mere statute of limitations to be pleaded by the
defendant. The court has said that the plaintiff must introduce evidence at the trial showing that the action was brought within the statutory period to make out a cause of action. The cases leave the impression that this statutory requirement is a part of the plaintiff's cause of
action; as a consequence, it is readily understandable how a pleader
might deduce that such an allegation is necessary in a wrongful death
complaint. Moreover, the North Carolina Supreme Court indicated by
dictum in Wilson v. Chastain4 that an allegation of compliance with the
statutory time limit is necessary.
In the recent case of Colyar v. Atlantic States Motor Lines,5 however, the court repudiated its former dictum, and held it is not necessary
to allege specifically that the action is brought within the statutory period. In this case the complaint alleged the date of the death, but there
was no allegation that the action had been brought within one year from
the death. It appeared from the summons that the action had been
brought within the year. The court reasoned that the statutory period
is "not an element of the cause of action," and that the plaintiff could
prove compliance with the statutory requirement by introducing the
summons in evidence.
The following conclusions seem warranted from a review of the
cases. Where the complaint alleges only the date of the death, and the
summons shows that the action has been brought within a year, the
plaintiff has a complaint sufficient against demurrer ;6 since dates which
appear as a matter of record may be considered by the court in ruling on
a demurrer, 7 and the statutory period is not an element of the cause of
action. Conversely, where the summons shows that the suit was not
brought within the statutory period, the complaint is subject to a demurrer or motion to dismiss& Where the complaint contains a specific
allegation that the action was brought within the year, and the dates
228 N. C. 574, 46 S. E. 2d 700 (1948) ; Curlee v. Duke Power Co., 205 N. C. 644,
172 S. E. 329 (1934) ; Mathis v. Camp Mfg. Co., 204 N. C. 434, 168 S. E. 515

(1933) ; Tieffenbrun v. Flannery, 198 N. C. 397, 151 S. E. 857 (1930) ; Neely v.

Minus, 196 N. C. 345, 145 S. E. 771 (1928) ; Hanie v. Penland, 193 N. C. 800,
138 S. E. 165 (1927) ; McGuire v. Montvale Lumber Co., 190 N. C. 806, 131 S. E.

274 (1925) ; Hatch v. Alamance Ry. Co., 183 N. C. 617, 112 S. E. 529 (1922) ;
Bennett v. N. C. Ry. Co., 159 N. C. 345, 74 S. E. 883 (1911) ; Trull v. Seaboard
A. L. Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 545, 66 S. E. 586 (1909); Gulledge v. Seaboard A. L.

Ry., 148 N. C. 567, 62 S.E. 732 (1908).
'See 230 N. C. 390, 391, 53 S.E. 2d 290, 291 (1949).
231 N. C. 318, 56 S. E. 2d 647 (1949), Erwin, J. dissenting on basis of the
general rule that what the pleador must prove, he must plead.
See Bailey v. Michael, 231 N. C. 404, 408, 57 S. E. 2d 372, 375 (1950).
George v. Southern Ry. Co., 210 N. C. 58, 185 S. E. 431 (1936) ; Harper v.
Bullock, 198 N. C. 448, 152 S. E. 405 (1930); Harrington v. Wadesboro, 153
N. C. 437, 69 S.E. 399 (1910).
1Hanie v. Penland, 193 N. C. 800, 138 S. E. 165 (1927).
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alleged leave doubt as to whether the action has been brought within
this period, the complaint will withstand demurrer.9 The requirement
that the action be brought within a year is absolute, and no explanation
as to why the institution of the action is delayed is availing. 10 "The
lapse of the statutory period not only bars the remedy but destroys the
liability.""
The question remains as to the sufficiency of a complaint which fails
to allege either the date of the death or that the action has been brought
within one year of the death, assuming a cause of action to have been
stated otherwise. Certain language in the Colyar case seems to indicate
2
that such a complaint would withstand demurrer.1
It is believed that the result of the Colyar case is practical and based
on sound reason. The purpose of this statutory time limit is said to be
to give notice to the defendant so that the evidence may be secured and
preserved.' 3 This notice is given when the plaintiff institutes his action
within the year. It seems unduly technical to require a specific allegation that "this action is brought within one year of the death" when
compliance with the statutory requirement may be shown by reference
to the summons. If it were held that such an allegation is necessary,
then questions would arise as to whether a complaint without this allegation failed to state a cause of action, or merely constituted a defective
statement of a good cause of action. If it were held that such a complaint does not state a cause of action, then an amendment after the
statutory period containing the required allegation would not relate
back to the complaint, and the plaintiff would be defeated on a technicality.' 4 It must be remembered that the purpose of the pleadings is to
frame the issues between the parties for a trial on the merits of the case,
rather than to create a pitfall for the unwary pleader.
MASON P. THOM AS, JR.
Restraint of Trade-Fair Trade Acts-Constitutionality
Manufacturers have long sought ways to protect their good will in
the trade-marks, brands, or names of their commodities. One means
'Wilson v. Chastain, 230 N. C. 390, 53 S. E. 2d 290 (1949) (Complaint alleged death ".

. . occurred on or about midnight of 21-22 November, 1947, and
which is less than one year next proceeding the institution of this action ..
Summons was served on November 22, 1948).
" Curlee v. Duke Power Co., 205 N. C. 644, 172 S. E. 329 (1934) ; Best v.
Kinston, 106 N. C. 205, 10 S. E. 997 (1890); Taylor v. Cranberry Iron Co., 94
N. C. 525 (1886).
" See
2'See

Webb v. Eggleston, 228 N. C. 574, 577, 46 S. E. 2d 700, 702 (1948).
231 N. C. 318, 319, 56 S. E. 2d 647, 648 (1949) ("The plaintiff complied

with the statute when she brought her suit within the prescribed time.").
"3See Trull v. Seaboard A. L. Ry. Co., 151 N. C. 545, 548, 66 S. E. 586, 587
(1909).
"Davis v. Rhodes, 231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949) ; Webb v. Eggleston,
228 N. C. 574, 46 S. E. 700 (1948), 27 N. C. L. R~v. 160; Note, Amendinents
Changing the Cause of Action--Lintitations of Actions, 25 N. C. L. REv. 76 (1946).
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employed is the fixing of the prices tlat the retailer is to charge the
consumer, thus preventing that price-cutting by the retailer which is
likely to create in the minds of the public a feeling that the goods are
not worth the prices usually charged'
With the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890, "every
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or com-

merce among the several states, or with foreign nations" was declared
illegal.2 In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., the
Supreme Court of the United States held that price-fixing by means of
minimum resale price maintenance contracts was prohibited by the Sherman Act. Some state courts reached the same result in cases involving
intrastate commerce, basing their decisions on the contracts being in
restraint of trade and illegal under common law principles or state anti4
trust laws. The majority of the states, however, upheld their legality.
Various devices, such as refusing to sell to those who do not maintain
prices, 5 or the constituting of "good faith agencies," 6 were used to circumvent the Supreme Court ruling in the Dr. Miles case; but they were
7
not widely used and when attempted were difficult to administer.
FTC, 1 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 8 (1929).
15 U. S. C. 1 (1946).

220 U. S. 373 (1911); accord, United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252
U. S. 85 (1920).

' Holding the contracts invalid: Mills v. General Ordnance Co., 113 Kan. 479,
215 Pac. 314 (1923); New Century Mfg. Co. v. Scheurer, 45 S.W. 2d 560 (Tex.
App. 1932) ; cf. Texas Standard Cotton Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Tex. 650, 19 S.W.
274 (1892).
Holding the contracts valid: D. Ghirardelli & Co. v. Hunsicker, 164 Cal. 355,
128 Pac. 1041 (1912); Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal. 611, 105 Pac. 745 (1909);
Garst v. Charles, 187 Mass. 144, 72 N. E. 839 (1905) ; Garst v. Harris, 177 Mass.
72, 58 N. E. 174 (1900); Clark v. Frank, 17 Mo. App. 602 (1885); Murphy v.
Christian Press Ass'n. Pub. Co., 38 App. Div. 426, 56 N. Y. Supp. 597 (1899);
Fisher Flouring Mills Co. v. Swanson, 76 Wash. 649, 137 Pac. 144 (1913).
' United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U. S. 300 (1919); Harriet Hubbard
Ayer, Inc. v. FTC, 15 F. 2d 274 (2d Cr.), cert. denied, 273 U. S.759 (1926).
. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476 (1926) (retail dealers
were appointed agents; goods consigned to them with the manufacturer paying
transportation charges and the dealer meeting all other expenses, the dealer to
account periodically, and the merchandise remaining the property of the manufacturer until sold by the dealers).
Another method was issuing bona fide licenses containing minimum resale price
clauses as to patented articles. WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE Acrs 27 (1938).
' Among the methods held illegal were:
(1) Use by the manufacturer of "cooperative steps," which consisted in ascertaining price-cutters by an elaborate and market-wide follow-up system of espionage and reporting, and a refusal to sell to the price-cutters until securing their
assurances of price maintenance. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441
(1922), Resale Price Maintenance, 1 N. C. L. REv. 36; NORwOOD, TRADE PRACTIcE
AND PRICE LAW 134 et seq. (1938).
(2) Issuing "licenses" which were obviously a sham to protect prices on patented articles. Strauss v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 243 U. S. 490 (1917)
(manufacturer received full compensation before parting with the possession of
the merchandise; no accounting by the retail dealer required; no recordation of
title retention by the manufacturer) ; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co.,
246 U. S.8 (1918).
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Several states, with California in 1931 being the first, encouraged
minimum resale price-fixing by enacting what were called Fair Trade
Acts. 8 These Acts provide that vertical contracts9 prescribing minimum
resale prices for trade-marked, branded, or named commodities in free
and open competition with commodities of other manufacturers of the
same general class will be legal and enforceable. 10 But in view of the
Sherman Act such contract were legal only in intrastate commerce.
In 1937, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Amendment" to the
Sherman Act legalizing minimum resale price maintenance contracts in
interstate commerce where such contracts are legal in intrastate commerce under the law of the state where the resale is to be made. To
date, Fair Trade Acts have been enacted in all jurisdictions except
Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.' 2
Immediately after their inception the constitutionality of the Fair
Trade Acts was questioned on various grounds, including denial of due
process, impairment of the obligation of contract, improper delegation
of legislative power, denial of equal protection of the law, and miscellaneous state constitutional provisions.' 3 At firs. several lower state
courts, as well as the Court of Appeals of New York, held them unconstitutional. 14 Reversing this early trend, the Supreme Court of the
United States in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers

Corp.1 ruled that these Acts passed by the states were not in contra-

(3) Affixing a notice to a patented article warning that cut-price sales would
constitute a patent infringement. Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1 (1913).
I WEIGEL, THE FAiR Ta AD Acrs 32 et seq. (1938).
9
A vertical contract is one between manufacturer and retailer, or between
wholesaler and retailer, etc., as distinguished from a horizontal contract, one between producers, between wholesalers, or between retailers.
" An analysis of the different provisions of the state Fair Trade Acts is found
in AmERICAN FAIR TRADE COUNCIL, INC., A PRAcTICA GUIDE To FAir TRAD. LAW
10-11 (1948).
%15 U. S. C. 1 (1946). The Amendment, which expressly excludes horizontal
contracts from its provisions, was passed as a rider to an appropriations bill for
the District of Columbia. President Roosevelt, when signing the bill on August 17,
1937, denounced this practice and expressed fear that the law would lead to increased prices to consumers. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 17058 (1948).

For a discussion of the Amendment's limitations, see

AND PRICE LAW 139
1

et seq. (1938).

NORWOOD, TRADE

PRACTICE

1 AmEICAN FAir TRADE Cou-cIL, INC., A PRACTiCAL GUIDE TO FAIR TRADE
LAW 4-5 (1948). The North Carolina statute is N. C. GEN. STAT. §§66-50 through
66-57 (1943), 15 N. C. L. REv. 367 (1937).
By express statute, "fair trade" is illegal in Missouri, Texas, and the District
of Columbia. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff7098 (1949). Its status in Vermont is
still uncertain. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff7096 (1949).
See Note, 125 A. L. R. 1339 (1940).
1'Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936),
overruled by Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30
(1937).
See WEIGEL, THE FAIR TRADE Acrs 36 et seq. (1938) for the early history of
the Fair Trade Acts and the uncertainty as to their constitutionality.
15299 U. S. 183 (1936) ; accord, The Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S.
198 (1936).
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vention of the Constitution of the United States. Heavily relying on
this affirmation of constitutionality, state courts, including North Carolina, almost uniformly held that the Fair Trade Acts did not violate the
constitution of the state, all earlier decisions to the contrary being re16
versed or overruled.
Recently, "fair trade" has suffered what has been called its "stiffest
blow" since its inception in California in 1931.17 In Liquor Store, I1W.
v. Continental Distilling Corp.,1 8 the Florida Supreme Court held that
the Florida Fair Trade Act violated the state constitution. The court
stated that although the Florida Act may have been constitutional when
passed in 1939, under present economic conditions it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and wholly outside the enacting powers of the state legislature.
The Florida Court should have recognized that whether "fair trade"
be economically wise or unwise, the weighing of all the interests involved
should more properly be a matter for legislative discretion than a subject for judicial pronouncement.' 9
" Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Seignious, 30 F. Supp. 549 (E. D. S. C. 1939);
Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4 S. E. 2d 528 (1939); Max Factor &
Co. v. Kunsman, 5 Cal. 2d 446, 55 P. 2d 177 (1936) ; Pyroil Sales Co. v. The Pep
Boys, 5 Cal. 2d 784, 55 P. 2d 194 (1936); Burroughs Welcome & Co. v. Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co., 128 Conn. 596, 24 A. 2d 841 (1942); Seagram-Distillers Corp. v. Old Dearborn Distributing Co., 363 Ill.
610, 2 N. E. 2d 940 (1936);
International Cellucotton Products v. Kraus Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So. 2d 303 (1942);
Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 176 Md. 682, 7 A. 2d 176 (1939) ; Weco Products Co. v. Sam's Cut Rate, Inc., 296 Mich. 190, 295 N. W. 611 (1941) ; Johnson
& Johnson v. Weissbard Brothers, 121 N. J. Eq. 585, 191 Atl. 873 (1937); Bourjois Sales Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. 2d 30 (1937), overruling
Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936);
Broxmeyer v. Polikoff, 39 Pa. D. & C. 224 (1940); Welch Grape Juice Co. v.
Frankfort Grocery Co., 36 Pa. D. & C. 653 (1939); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v.
Owl Drug Co., 67 S. D. 523, 295 N. W. 292 (1940); Sears v. Western Thrift
Stores of Olympia, Inc., 10 Wash. 2d 372, 116 P. 2d 756 (1941) ; Weco Products
Co. v. Reed Drug Co., 225 Wis. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937) (except a provision
exempting non-profit cooperatives).
The Florida Supreme Court, in Bristol Myers Co. v. Webb's Cut Rate Drug
Co., 137 Fla. 508, 188 So. 91 (1939), declared the Florida Fair Trade Act unconstitutional since the title did not show that the Act applied to non-signers. This
defect was soon remedied by legislative action.
17 Business Week, April 23, 1949, p. 19.
1840 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1949).
20 In an attempt to get around the court's decision, the 1949 Florida legislature
passed a new Fair Trade Act, SE,. BILL No. 592, Laws of 1949, effective June 1,
1949, with two notable changes: (1) A "finding of fact' by the legislature that
"fair trade" best serves the interests and general welfare of the state of Florida
(To this the court would probably reply,

".

. . the mere designation of an act as

best serving [the interests and general welfare of the state] does not preclude
judicial appraisal, and courts of equity will not be misled by mere devices or baffled
by mere forms, but they will disregard names and penetrate disguises of form to
discover the substance of an act or transaction." Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 385 (Fla. 1949)), and (2) the AttorneyGeneral is empowered "to bring actions to restrain performance of any fair-trade
contracts that prevent competition in the manufacture, making, transportation, sale,
or purchase of commodities of the same general class." Business Week, June 18,
1949, p. 72; 63 HARv. L. REv. 546 (1950).
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Indeed, it was not even necessary for the Florida court to consider
the question of constitutionality. By the court's own admission, the
contracts under consideration could have been declared invalid since
there was not that free and open competition which the Miller-Tydings
Amendment and the Florida Fair Trade Act require, inasmuch as the
plaintiff was a subsidiary of a corporation which with four others controlled from eighty to ninety per cent of the supply of alcoholic liquors
in the United States. 20 Nevertheless, contrary to the usual judicial
procedure, the court went out of its way to declare the Act unconstitutional.
Soon after the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, a Mississippi
lower court, faced with questions similar to those posed before the
Florida Court, decided that the Fair Trade Act of that state was unconstitutional.21
In states where the power of the legislature to pass Fair Trade Acts
has been affirmed, courts have recently been critical of the manner in
which the legislature has undertaken to exercise this power. The Illinois court has ruled that the Mandatory Fair Trade Act, requiring all
liquor sold in Illinois to be "fair-traded" and a list of such prices filed
with the state liquor-regulatory body, is unconstitutional since it is not
complete in itself but refers to the Fair Trade Act without explaining
what constitutes "fair trade." 22 New York has held that the legislature
unduly delegated its powers when it created a commission with authority
to decide for itself whether or not liquor should be "fair-traded," and
at what prices it should be sold.23
Oklahoma has taken the same critical attitude. Where the "fair
trade" price allowed the retailer a profit of about 375%, resale at that
price was ruled unenforceable as being an arbitrarily and capriciously
fixed price which allowed an unreasonable margin of profit. 24

If the

reasoning of the Oklahoma court is followed, courts may be able to
eliminate some of the evils of high prices resulting from "fair trade"
without the necessity of declaring the Fair Trade Act itself unconstitutional.
There has never been a direct ruling on the constitutionality of the
Miller-Tydings Amendment, but anti-fair traders think the present
Supreme Court would declare that it contravenes the United States
Constitution. 25 About thirty states have yet to rule on the constitu"Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 376 (Fla.

1949).
" Shaeffer Pen Co. v. Barret, 4 CCH

TRADE, REG. REP. 162,399 (Miss. 1949).
-2Illinois Liquor Control Commission v. Chicago's Last Chance Liquor Store,
Inc.,2 88 N. E. 2d 15 (Ill. 1949).
Levine v. O'Connell, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 672 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
"Julius Schmid, Inc. v. McKay, 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP.162,509 (Okla. 1949).
-'Business Week, April 23, 1949, p. 19, at 20.
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tionality of their Fair Trade Acts.2 6 The Anti-Trust Division of the
Department of Justice27 and the Federal Trade Commission 28 are at
present leading an attack in Congress on the Miller-Tydings Amendment;20 and bills have been introduced in at least three state legislatures
to repeal or emasculate the Fair Trade Act of that state. 30 If either
attack on the federal law should prove successful, then minimum resale
price maintenance contracts would be illegal in interstate commerce
under the provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.3 1 In the event
of a successful attack on a state law, resale price maintenance contracts
in that state would probably be illegal in intrastate commerce;32 in
which case the Miller-Tydings Amendment, even if retained, makes
them illegal in interstate commerce if the resale is to take place in a state
where the contracts are not valid.
Among the chief grounds of attack on "fair trade" in the legislatures
will be the assertions that it tends to eliminate competition, 33 that the
property rights of the retailer in the goods are encroached upon,34 and
" See note 16 supra. Only three out of the six judges who held the Fair Trade
Act of North Carolina constitutional in Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 216 N. C. 163, 4

S. E. 2d 528 (1939) are still on the bench. The lone dissenter, J. Barnhill, is still

on the court.
" Herbert A. Bergson, head of the Anti-Trust Division of the Dept. of Justice,
has said, "It [the Miller-Tydings Amendment] creates a disturbing conflict between legal price fixing and the general price fixing inhibitions of the Sherman
Act." Shoenfeld, Congress Squares Off for a Scrap on Fair Trade Repeal, 62
SALES MANAGEMENT, p. 81, 83 (June 1, 1949).
See TNEC, INVESTIGATION OF
CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 232
et seq. (1941), attacking the manner in which the enactment of the Miller-Tydings
Amendment and the state Fair Trade Acts was secured, and asserting that many
"fair trade" contracts do not comply with one or both of those laws.
"8"The Miller-Tydings Amendment legalizes contracts whose object is to require all dealers to sell at not less than the resale price stipulated by contract
without reference to their individual selling costs or selling policies. The Commission believes that the consumer is not only entitled to competition between rival
products but to competition between dealers handling the same branded product."
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE

COMMISSION

ON

RESALE

PRICE MAINTENANCE,

LXIV (1945).

"XXXIX Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70 Rep. O'Toole (D., N. Y.) has introduced
a bill to repeal the Amendment, and Rep. Celler (D., N. Y.) has proposed an
investigation of it by the House Judiciary Committee. Business Week, April 23,
1949, p. 19. Rep. Klein (D., N. Y.), however, has introduced a bill to validate
minimum price agreements in the District of Columbia. Shoenfeld, Congress
Squares Off for a Scrap on FairTrade Repeal, 62 SALES MANAGEMENT 81 (June 1,
1949).
"0Business Week, April 23, 1949, p. 19; Shoenfeld, Congress Squares Off for a
Scrap on Fair Trade Repeal, 62 SALES MANAGEMENT 81 (June 1, 1949).
As an indication of the trend in thought, the North Carolina House of Representatives rejected by a 41-40 vote a measure to put into effect in North Carolina
the Unfair Practices Act, now law in about thirty states, which would hat e made
it illegal for merchants to sell goods at less than cost in order to discourage or
destroy competition. News and Observer, April 20, 1949, p. 14, col. 3.
31 See OPPENHEIM, CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAwS 383-387 (1948).
83 See note 4 supra.
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373, 400

(1911).

" Liquor Store, Inc. v. Continental Distilling Co., 40 So. 2d 371, 375 (Fla.
1949).
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35

Leading counter-arguthat higher prices result from these contracts.
ments will be that this method is the only effective way to protect the
good will of the manufacturer,3 6 that the dealer takes the goods with
the contract attached,3 7 and that the prices on non-fair-traded goods
have risen more sharply than those on fair-traded commodities.3 8
Future litigation and legislative controversy over resale price maintenance appear to be a certainty. Whether "fair trade" be economically
wise or unwise, the trend shows that it is in for some minute examination by the courts and legislative bodies.
KIRBY SULLIVAN.

Trial Practice-Prosecutor's Comments-Arguing Possibility of
Parole or Pardon as Reason for Withholding Recommendation
for Life Imprisonment
"Gentlemen, . . . With our system in Georgia, a man is entitled to
parole or pardon after seven years, and when his application is put in
all the judges or interested parties are usually out of office and no one
recalls the facts in the crime. If this jury sentenced this defendant to
life imprisonment and he should be given his release on parole in seven
"XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75; XXXIX Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 85;
Shoenfeld, Congress Squares Off for a Scrap on Fair Trade Repeal, 62 SALES
MANAGEMENT 81 (June 1, 1949). Other arguments of those opposed to "fair trade' are:
(1) As the "fair trade" fields become more crowded there will tend to be an
elimination of the small retailer since the old-timers will try to restrict the number
of new dealers. XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75, 76. This is claimed to have
already happened to some extent in England. XXXIX Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70,
166.
(2) The manufacturer can adequately protect his good will by refusing to sell
to those who refuse to comply with a resale price agreement. Liquor Store, Inc.
v. Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So. 2d 371, 388 (Fla. 1949).

(3) Chain stores reap unnecessarily juicy profits by reason of less expense in

marketing "fair-traded" goods, and they often sell similar products under their
own brand or trade name at cheaper prices. XXXIX Fortune, April 1949, p. 75;

TNEC

INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF EcONOMIC POWER, FINAL REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 232, 234-5 (1941).
" Newcomb, In Defense of Fair Trade, 13 JOURNAL OF MARKETING 84, 85

(Juy 1948).

" Callman, "Fair Trade" and Anti-Trust Law, 10 U. oF PiTT. L. REY. 443, 462

(1949).
" Griffiths, Further Comments on) Fair Trade, 13
(July 1948).

JOURNAL OF MARKETING

85

Other arguments urged in support of "fair trade" are:
(1) The "fair trade" system has been of tremendous benefit to a number of

industries. Behoteguy, Resale Price Maintenance in the Tire Industry, 13 JOURNAL
OF MARKETING 315, 319 (Jan. 1949).

(2) "Fair trade" protects the consumer from deceptive price-cutting tactics.
AMERICAN FAIR TRADE COUNCIL, INC., A PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO FAIR TRADE LAWS

34 (1948).
(3) "Fair trade" is no barrier to competition between rival articles. Callman,
"FairTrade" and Anti-Trust Law, 10 U. OF PITT. L. REv. 443, 452 (1949).
(4) In those states allowing fixed prices, the manufacturer may hold down
prices.
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years, you would be turning him loose upon society after a few years
imprisonment." Such was the argument of counsel for the state in
Bryan v. State.' The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree and withheld a recommendation of mercy. The death sentence automatically followed. In affirming the judgment, the Supreme
Court of Georgia held that the refusal of the trial court to declare a
mistrial was not error under the rulings in McLendon v. State.2 One
judge dissented. Two concurred specially "for the reason only that
this Court is bound by former full-bench decisions." 3
The full-bench decisions referred to begin with Lucas v. State,4
where such an argument was held not improper since the recommendation of mercy was within the discretion of the jury and had nothing
5
to do with the guilt of the accused. Subsequent unanimous decisions,
6
interspersed with "majority-dissent" cases and one which affirms a
verdict by an equally divided court,7 condemn the argument as tending
to prejudice the jury against the accused but hold that corrective measures on the part of the trial court will prevent the necessity of declaring
a mistrial."
The propriety of such comments on the part of prosecuting attorneys
has been most frequently considered in the state of Kentucky. The
practice has been repeatedly disapproved and, under special circumstances, has contributed to reversals. 9 However, the Kentucky court
has consistently refused to reverse on this point alone,10 having affirmed
1206 Ga. 73, 55 S. E. 2d 574 (1949).
2205 Ga. 55, 52 S. E. 2d 294 (1949).
wrote the opinion in McLendon
2 One of these concurring judges (Wyatt, J.)
v. State, supra note 2, wherein he expressed the same personal dissatisfaction,
saying that such argument was improper and should result in a mistrial unless the
trial court (1) acted promptly to prevent it and (2) instructed the jury to disregard. "Full-bench," as here used, seems to indicate unanimity of opinion as well
as perfection of attendance.
'146 Ga. 315, 91 S. E. 72 (1916).
Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566, 34 S. E. 2d 849 (1945) ; Thornton v. State, 190
Ga. 783, 10 S. E. 2d 746 (1940) ; Manchester v. State, 171 Ga. 121, 155 S. E. 11
(1930).
' Sloan v. State, 183 Ga. 108, 187 S. E. 670 (1936) ; White v. State, 177 Ga.
115 t 169 S. E. 499 (1933).
Biggers v. State, 171 Ga. 596, 156 S. E. 201 (1930).
S From its continued use, it is apparent that Georgia prosecutors believe the
argument to be effective notwithstanding instructions to the jury to disregard. On
the other hand, the repeated expressions of dissatisfaction emanating from the
Georgia court apparently encourage defense counsel to argue the point on appeal
in the hope that the court will eventually reverse itself.
0 Crawford v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 498, 95 S. W. 2d 12 (1936) (youthful
defendant convicted on questionable evidence) ; Berry v. Commonwealth, 227 Ky.
528, 13 S. W. 2d 521 (1929) (abundant evidence of insanity) ; Estepp v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 156, 214 S. W. 891 (1919) (other errors). The Berry case was
expressly overruled in Powell v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 234, 123 S. W. 2d 279
(1938).
"oBass v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 177 S. W. 2d 386 (1944) ; Powell v.
Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 234, 123 S. W. 2d 279 (1938) ; Underwood v. Commonwealth, 266 Ky. 613, 99 S. W. 2d 467 (1936) ; Lee v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 15,
89 S. W. 2d 316 (1935) ; Lotheridge v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 500, 86 S. W. 2d
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judgments imposing the death penalty where objections to such remarks
were overruled by the trial court." This court has at times marvelled
that prosecutors continue to use the argument in the face of its disapproval, 12 but has since seemed content to hold it not prejudicial to
the "substantial rights of the accused."' 3
What are the substantial rights of the accused, and have they been
prejudiced? In most jurisdictions where the jury has power to reduce
the penalty in capital cases by recommendation, it is discretionary ;14
and a few of these courts hold that the jury may properly consider the
effect of a possible pardon or parole in determining whether to qualify
their verdict.' 5 Theoretically, at least, the measure of punishment becomes important only after the guilt of the accused has been ascertained.
It may then be argued that, being guilty of a capital offense, the criminal
can demand, as a matter of right, nothing more than that his execution
proceed according to law. On the other hand, whether guilty or innocent, the accused has a right of trial by an impartial jury,' 0 and the
278 (1935) ; Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S. W. 2d 817 (1935) ; Glenday
v. Commonwealth, 255 Ky. 313, 74 S. W. 2d 332 (1934); Holmes v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 573, 44 S.W. 2d 592 (1931) ; Miller v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky.
448, 33 S. W. 2d 590 (1930) ; Moore v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 128, 3 S. W. 2d
190 (1928); Hall v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 718 270 S. W. 5 (1925); Bolin v.
Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 608, 268 S. W. 306 (1925).
"Lee v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 15, 89 S. W. 2d 316 (1935) ; Moore v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 128, 3 S.W. 2d 190 (1928).
1 "We are loath to believe that such action on their [the prosecutors'] part is
encouraged because these arguments, although condemned, have under the particular facts in the cases involved been held by us not so prejudicial as to warrant
a reversal." Seymour v. Commonwealth, 220 Ky. 348, 354, 295 S. W. 142, 145
(1927). Again in Lee v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 15, 19, 89 S.W. 2d 316, 317
(1935) : "Time after time we have condemned the use of such arguments by attorneys for the commonwealth, and why they will persist in the use of it we cannot
understand;
but in only one case have we reversed a judgment on that account...."
3
Bass v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 177 S.W. 2d 386 (1944) ; cf. Long v.
Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 83, 155 S.W. 2d 246 (1941).
"Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. 303 (1899) (federal statute). "They
may do so with or without a reason, and they may decline to do so with or without
a reason. They may do so as a matter of public policy, or out of mere sympathy
for the prisoner, or they may decline to do so for reasons of public policy, or on
account of absence of sympathy for the accused." Lucas v. State, 146 Ga. 315,
326, 91 S.E. 72, 77 (1916). From the absolute discretion here depicted by the
Georgia court, the power of the jury runs through varying degrees of restriction
depending on the offense and the jurisdiction. An extensive treatment of this
point may be found in 17 A. L. R. 1117 (1922) and Supplements, 87 A. L. R. 1362
(1933) ; 138 A. L. R. 1230 (1942).
" Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P. 2d 312 (1936) ; House v. State, 192
Ark. 476, 92 S.W. 2d 868 (1936) ; Watts v. State, 82 N. E. 2d 846 (Ind. 1948) ;
Massa v. State, 37 Ohio App. 532, 175 N. E. 219 (1930) ; State v. Carroll, 52
Wyo. 29, 69 P. 2d 542 (1937). See Notes, 51 HARV.L. Ray. 353 (1937) ; 90 U.
PA. L. REv. 221 (1941). One court adheres to this view under a statute providing
for a recommendation by the jury ". . . upon and after the consideration of all the
evidence." N. J.STAT. ANN. §2:138-4 (1939), State v. Molnar, 133 N. 3. L. 327,
44 A. 2d 197 (1945). The quoted provision was added by Pub. Laws 1919, c. 134,
§1 after the court had construed the power of recommendation to be within the
unlimited discretion of the jury. State v. Martin, 92 N. J. L. 436, 106 Atl. 385
(1919).
0
" Compare U. S. Co-xsT. A-ENnD. VI ("impartial jury"), with N. C. CONST.
Art. I, §13 ("good and lawful men").
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legislative delegation of the power to reduce the penalty to that same
body would seem to evince an intent that the power be exercised with
impartiality. Equality under the law is not to be attained by permitting
the prosecuting attorney to prevail upon the jury to forego what may be
an otherwise satisfactory course of action in order to preclude the future application of that which he considers bad parole law administered
by irresponsible officials.17 Here, under the cloak of "due process," is
something savoring of mob rule.
At any rate, the great majority of courts denounce the argument as
improper in that it interferes with the discretion of the jury'8 or presents a possibility of prejudice, 19 or because the granting or withholding
of pardons and paroles is not a jury function. 20 Yet, no case has been
found in which the mere injection of the argument, without aggravating
circumstances, has been held so prejudicial as to require a reversal of
a judgment imposing the death penalty. The usual test for prejudice
has been its positive appearance 2l and, since the penalty imposed is discretionary, only the evidence supporting that portion of the verdict determining the defendant's guilt is considered reviewable. 22
1" "If prosecuting officers have any complaint to make because of the exercise
of certain powers that are conferred by law upon another tribunal, they should
make such complaints at a proper time and place, and not seek to influence a jury
to do something to prevent such other tribunal from passing judgment upon the
case upon its merits, when it is actually brought before it. Neither the prosecutor
nor the jury are or can be held responsible for the acts of the 'power' whose duty
it may become to pass upon the question whether a sentence shall be commuted
or not." State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 431, 126 Pac. 286, 293 (1912).
1' "No self-respecting judge would permit a prosecuting officer to lecture him
as to his right to fix the punishment within lawful limits, and in the present instance the trial judge should have interposed to protect the jury and the defendant
from the attorney's assumption of privileges the law gives to the jury alone."
Jacobs v. State, 103 Miss. 622, 627, 60 So. 723, 724 (1913).
1' Peterson v. State, 231 Ala. 625, 166 So. 20 (1936) ; People v. Caetano, 29
Cal. 2d 616, 177 P. 2d 1 (1947); Brady v. State, 199 Ga. 566, 34 S. E. 2d 849
(1945) ; People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 609 (1916) ; State v. Junkins,
147 Iowa 588, 126 N. W. 689 (1910); Crawford v. Commonwealth, 264 Ky. 498,
95 S. W. 2d 12 (1936) ; State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940) ; Augustine v. State, 201 Miss. 277, 28 So. 2d 243 (1946) ; Tapedo v. State; 34 Okla. Crim.
App. 165, 245 Pac. 897 (1926) ; Commonwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa. 544, 21 A. 2d
38 (1941) ; Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S. E. 414 (1929) ; State
v. Knapp, 194 Wash. 286, 77 P. 2d 985 (1938).
"Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Farrell v. People,
133 Ill. 244, 24 N. E. 423 (1890) ; Pena v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. Rep. 311, 129
S. W. 2d 667 (1939) ; State v. Thorne, 41 Utah 414, 126 Pac. 286 (1912).
21 As explained by the Kentucky court, ". . . whether the error thereby committed [by the argument] would be sufficiently prejudicial in all cases to authorize
a reversal of a conviction would necessarily depend upon the particular facts of
the case; i.e., whether the error in the light of the proven facts was calculated to
produce such a prejudicial effect on the verdict of the jury as to entitle the convicted defendant to a new trial, or whether, under the facts, the argument, though
improper, could not possibly produce such a prejudicial effect and was therefore
immaterial." Tiernay v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 201, 204, 43 S. W. 2d 661, 663
(1931).
""But see Dent, J., dissenting in State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va. 1, 12, 20 S. E.
873, 877 (1894): "Granting that the prisoner was guilty of murder in the first
degree,... the law, in tender consideration of human frailties, seeks to distinguish
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Prior to 1941, a conviction of any of the four capital crimes 28 in
North Carolina carried the mandatory death penalty and a recommenda24
tion of mercy contained in a jury's verdict was treated as surplusage.
In that year the jury was authorized to reduce the penalty for burglary
and arson to life imprisonment by appending a recommenation to their
verdict,2 5 but the question here under discussion seems not to have
arisen. In March, 1949, however, all four sections were rewritten to
permit such a recommendation, apparently to be discretionary, 20 The
pertinent North Carolina parole statute27 provides that all prisoners
serving a life sentence shall become entitled to a hearing on an application for parole after a minimum service of ten years.
Under this state of the law, it would seem but a matter of time until
the propriety of arguing parole law in urging the jury to withhold a
recommendation of mercy comes before the Supreme Court of North
Carolina. This Court has previously decided, in cases not involving
the jury's power to recommend mercy, that reference to the right of
appeal or the possibility of executive clemency if the defendant should
be convicted constitutes reversible error. 28 These cases may indicate
that the similar practice here considered will likewise be condemned.
But the similarity is deceiving. Whereas the one assumes a verdict and
attempts to prevent a discretionary qualification, the other seeks to influence the jury in arriving at the verdict itself. 29
between the different degrees of depravity entering into each particular commission of the highest of crimes ....
The intemperate and unjustifiable language
used by the prosecutor was to inflame the minds of the jury, and prevent this
discrimination on their part. He accomplished his purpose [the death penalty],
which is the best evidence possible that the prisoner was prejudiced by his conduct."
" N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4200 (first degree murder), §4204 (rape),
§4233
(first degree burglary), §4238 (arson).
2
25,State v. Day, 215 N. C. 566, 2 S. E. 2d 569 (1939).
N. C. Pub. L. 1941, c. 215, §§ 1, 2.
2" . . shall suffer death, provided, if the jury, at the time of rendering the
verdict in open court, shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment
for life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury." N. C. Sess.
L. 1949, c. 299, §§1-4; 27 N. C. L. REv. 449 (1949). N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-20
(1943) (killing adversary in a duel) and id. §14-278 (malicious train-wrecking
resulting in a homicide) which also impose the death penalty were not mentioned.
The question arises whether they must also be deemed amended since their validity
under N. C. CoNsT. Art. XI, §2, which restricts the death penalty to the four
named crimes, depends upon their being treated as statutory specifications of situations constituting first degree murder wherein deliberation and premeditation are
conclusively
presumed.
7
N. C. GEN.
STAT. §148-58 (1943).
28 State v. Hawley, 229 N. C. 167, 48 S. E. 2d 35 (1948) ; State v. Little, 228
N. C. 417, 45 S. E. 2d 542 (1947).
9 Care should be exercised to distinguish between the two separate purposes,
depending on the situation at trial, which may be subserved by informing the jury
of possible leniency to be extended the prisoner by some other agency of government:
(1) Where there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, the possibilities of executive clemency or appellate reversal for error may be advanced as
an invitation to the jury to assume the psychological position of a small cog in
the machinery of justice and thus shed the responsibility for their verdict. E.g.,
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It is believed, however, that in order to avoid the dilemma existing
in Georgia and Kentucky, a definite stand should be taken either for or
against the use of the argument.30 Of these two positions, it is submitted that the injection of this line of argument into the proceedings of
a capital case should be held to result in a mistrial since (1) it cannot
be said with certainty that the impression thereby created can be erased
from the minds of the jurors, (2) the parole statutes pertain to a disGoff v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 428, 44 S. W. 2d 306 (1931) ; State v. Little, supra
note 28; Commonwealth v. Balles, 160 Pa. Super. 148, 50 A. 2d 729 (1946). As
this tends directly to alter the weight of evidence necessary to a conviction, it is
generally held highly prejudicial and doubt has been expressed whether its evil
effect can be eradicated by action of the trial court. See State v. Hawley, mipra
note 28.
(2) Where the guilt of the accused is all but conceded and the statute permits
the jury to assess the punishment, this becoming the principal issue involved, the
jury may be asked to avoid the effect of a future pardon or parole. The argument
seeks to impose upon the jury the responsibility for the inadequate punishment
and prospective crimes of the defendant by depicting the paroling authority as
irresponsible or the existing penal law as a farce. See, e.g. Bolin v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 608, 268 S. W. 306 (1925) ("weak-kneed governors and parole
commissioners"); Cobb v. State, 251 Ala. 505, 38 So. 2d 279 (1949) ("rotten"
penal system). Here, the prejudice, if any, is not so apparent, for assuming that
the jury has acted directly upon the suggestion, it remains to be determined whether
any rights of the accused have been violated.
Tacit recognition of this distinction may be implied from State v. Howard, 222
N. C. 291, 22 S. E. 2d 917 (1942) where, after a review of the cases involving
parole arguments designed to prevent a recommendation of mercy, the court decided that a prosecutor's reference to paroles was not so prejudicial as to warrant
a reversal of a conviction of embezzlement.
30 Due to local variations in the wording of the statutes, the vigilance of the
trial judges, the respect accorded to and the degree of control exercised by the
appellate courts, the results of any holding cannot be conclusively predicted for
any given jurisdiction. But with the situations in Georgia and Kentucky, compare
those in the following states where the question is apparently settled:
(1) Arizona: Argument held proper in Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P.
2d 312 (1936). The only subsequent case found involving the point followed the
former without comment. State v. Macias, 60 Ariz. 93, 131 P. 2d 810 (1942).
(2) Arkansas: Argument held not improper in House v. State, 192 Ark. 476,
92 S.W. 2d 868 (1936).
(3) Illinois: Overruling of objection to similar argument held reversible error
in Farrell v. People, 133 Ill. 244, 24 N. E. 423 (1890). The only subsequent case
found is People v. Murphy, 276 Ill. 304, 114 N. E. 609 (1916) wherein the overruling of an objection was held error but in as much as the argument was directed
toward two defendants, one of whom received a sentence of 99 years, the court
saw no apparent effect on the verdict.
(4) Louisiana: Overruling of objection to the argument held reversible error
in State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922) and where objection was
sustained, the argument itself contributed to a reversal in State v. Henry, 196 La.
217, 198 So. 910 (1940). The only other cases found are State v. Edwards, 155
La. 305, 99 So. 229 (1923) in which the argument appeared ineffective in that the
death penalty was not imposed, and State v. Burks, 196 La. 374, 199 So. 220 (1940)
where the effect of the argument was held eradicated by the trial court's instructions.
(5) Ohio: Instructions by court on pardon and parole held proper. Liska v.
State, 115 Ohio St. 283, 152 N. E. 667 (1926) ; Massa v. State, 37 Ohio App. 532,
175 N. E. 219 (1930).
(6) Virginia: Overruling of objection to the argument contributed to a reversal. Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S. E. 414 (1929).
(7) West Virginia: Argument held not improper. State v. Shawen, 40 W. Va.
1, 20 S. E. 873 (1894).
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tinct phase of our penal and correctional system with which the jury,
as such, has no concern, 3 1 and (3) to supply the deficiencies in existing
penal law is not the responsibility of the jury in the individual case.82
If, on the other hand, it be decided that matters of policy should be
left to the individual jury, such should be placed squarely before them
in the unbiased instructions of the trial judge rather than by an impassioned plea of the prosecuting attorney.
WILLIS C. BUMGARNER.
"Lovely v. United States, 169 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir. 1948).
" See note 17 supra.

